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Abstract: A scoping search and a systematic literature review were conducted to give an insight on
entry and exit screening referring to travelers at points of entry, by analyzing published evidence on
practices, guidelines, and experiences in the past 15 years worldwide. Grey literature, PubMed. and
Scopus were searched using specific terms. Most of the available data identified through the systematic
literature review concerned entry screening measures at airports. Little evidence is available about
entry and exit screening measure implementation and effectiveness at ports and ground crossings.
Exit screening was part of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) temporary recommendations
for implementation in certain points of entry, for specific time periods. Exit screening measures
for Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in the three most affected West African countries did not identify
any cases and showed zero sensitivity and very low specificity. The percentages of confirmed cases
identified out of the total numbers of travelers that passed through entry screening measures in
various countries worldwide for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) and EVD in West Africa were zero or
extremely low. Entry screening measures for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) did not
detect any confirmed SARS cases in Australia, Canada, and Singapore. Despite the ineffectiveness of
entry and exit screening measures, authors reported several important concomitant positive effects
that their impact is difficult to assess, including discouraging travel of ill persons, raising awareness,
and educating the traveling public and maintaining operation of flights from/to the affected areas.
Exit screening measures in affected areas are important and should be applied jointly with other
measures including information strategies, epidemiological investigation, contact tracing, vaccination,
and quarantine to achieve a comprehensive outbreak management response. Based on review results,
an algorithm about decision-making for entry/exit screening was developed.
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1. Introduction
Public health events can cause serious crises and damage to the human population if effective
frameworks and systems are not in place to prevent, early detect, and respond in a timely manner to
health threats. In recent years, events such as the Public Health Emergencies of International Concern
of Zika Virus Disease declared in 2016 and Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak declared in 2014
affected or have/had the potential to seriously affect a large amount of the population. High mobility
of populations across borders of countries can contribute to the rapid spread of diseases. Screening
measures on travelers at points of entry including airports, ports, and ground crossings can be
implemented to prevent international transmission of disease by detecting and prohibiting travel to
exposed or ill travelers from affected areas [1,2].
The International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005 states in articles 5, 13, 18, 19, and Annex 1B
that World Health Organisation (WHO) recommendations in response to a Public Health Emergency
of International Concern (PHEIC) may include screening measures at points of entry. Moreover,
WHO State Parties must have the capacities to apply entry or exit controls for arriving and departing
travelers [3]. Decision 1082/2013/European Union (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council
on serious cross-border threats to health requires that “Member States and the European Commission shall
consult each other within the Health Security Committee (HSC) . . . That consultation shall be aimed at “ . . .
supporting the implementation of core capacity requirements for surveillance and response as referred to in
Articles 5 and 13 of the IHR” [4], including capacities in implementing screening measures at borders.
Since the entry of IHR 2005 into force, the WHO Director General has declared five PHEIC
according to Article 12: in 2009 the Influenza Pandemic (H1N1), in 2014 the Poliovirus situation
worldwide, in 2014 and 2019 the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo respectively, and in 2016 the Zika virus disease [5]. Moreover, in 2003 the
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak alerted the global community. Temporary
recommendations about exit screening in affected countries have been issued by WHO and applied in
those countries. Other countries have implemented entry screening measures on travelers arriving
from affected countries at ports, airports, and ground crossings, in response to PHEIC or as part of the
routine measures to prevent disease introduction to their country [6–11].
As has been described in WHO technical guidance during past public health events, entry or exit
screening measures are generally conducted as a two-step process: primary screening and secondary
screening [1,2]. With the primary screening, an initial assessment is carried out by personnel, who may
not necessarily have public health or medical training. Activities include visual observation of travelers
for signs of the infectious disease, measurement of travelers’ body temperature, and completion of a
questionnaire by travelers asking for presence of symptoms and/or exposure to the infectious agent.
Travelers who have signs or symptoms of the infectious disease, or have been potentially exposed
to the infectious agent, are referred to secondary screening. Secondary screening should be carried
out by personnel with public health or medical training. It includes an in-depth interview, a focused
medical and laboratory examination and second temperature measurement [1,12]. Specific objectives
of entry or exit screening measures can include: identification of ill travelers who may have signs
and symptoms, and of travelers who may have been exposed to a hazard and their close contacts;
identification of appropriate public health measures, such as treatment, isolation, quarantine and travel
restrictions that are commensurate with the risks and do not unduly interfere with international travel;
proper collection of information and reporting of public health risks; provision of information and
education to the traveling public about health risks.
Screening measures can be implemented for long-time periods for specific diseases as part of the
country’s routine measures to prevent introduction of diseases to the country, or ad hoc after emergent
public health events. Moreover, screening measures could be implemented massively to all inbound
or outbound travelers at a point of entry, or targeted to specific travel routes (e.g., departing from an
affected area) or to specific travelers (e.g., who have been in an affected area).
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Previous attempts to assess the effectiveness of entry and exit screening measures have
demonstrated either limited public health impact of such measures [9,13,14], or evidence of success [15]
and benefits [6,16]. In the recent published literature, there is a lack of a systematic approach in
appraising the evidence for usefulness of screening measures that could help countries in their
decision-making on implementing health measures and allocating resources.
This paper describes the results of a scoping search and of a systematic bibliographic review aiming
at giving insight on entry and exit screening referring to travelers at points of entry worldwide, with an
emphasis among EU/European Economic Area (EEA) Member States (MS). Evidence from this study
was used to inform EU MS in the framework of a training course conducted in 2019 about entry/exit
screening structures and processes currently in place in EU MS and worldwide, as well as the strengths,
limitations and lessons learnt from applying entry/exit screening at points of entry. Decision-making
issues on implementing health measures that are commensurate with the risk, avoiding unnecessary
interference with international traffic and trade, and considering business continuity plans are also
discussed. Finally, the review explores preparedness issues and the capacities that must be in place at
points of entry to implement entry/exit screening for infectious diseases.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Methods for Scoping Search
2.1.1. Research Question
The scoping search was conducted to answer the following research questions:
(1) “What are the practices, guidelines and experiences worldwide on entry and exit screening for infectious
diseases to travelers at points of entry that have been published in the past 15 years?”
(2) “What are the effects, the benefits and the limitations of entry and exit screening measures for infectious
diseases to travelers at points of entry that have been published in the past 15 years?”
2.1.2. Search Strategy
Grey literature, PubMed and Scopus were searched for relevant documents published in the past
15 years using the following search terms: (exit screening OR entry screening OR border measure)
AND (patient OR ill OR sick OR infected OR affected OR exposed OR symptomatic) AND (human OR
passenger OR traveler OR traveler OR crew) AND (airport OR aerodrome OR airdrome OR seaport
OR port OR point of entry OR port of entry).
The scoping search was conducted independently of the systematic bibliographic review, which has
been presented in the last paragraph of the first chapter.
2.1.3. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Inclusion criteria were: articles or reports or other documents published in peer-reviewed journals
or national and international organizations’ publications, from 2003 until May 2018 that report practices,
implementation of guidelines, experiences, structures, processes, evaluation results about national
routine or ad hoc entry or exit screening activities referring to travelers at ports or airports or ground
crossings, worldwide, performed during serious cross-border health events.
Articles that refer to (a) migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers were excluded, except when
related to response to a global health emergency, (b) screening of diseases that were not part of a global
health emergency response, (c) entry or exit screening measures that were part of response to a specific
outbreak on board an airplane or a ship and not part of a country response to a global health threat.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4638 4 of 53
2.2. Methods for Systematic Bibliographic Review
2.2.1. Research Questions
The bibliographic review was conducted to answer the following research questions:
(1) What are the public health impact and the cost-effectiveness of implementing entry or exit
screening among travelers for infectious diseases at ports, airports, and ground crossings by using
different assessment methods?
(2) What are the good practices for implementing entry or exit screening among travelers for
infectious diseases at ports, airports, and ground crossings?
2.2.2. Specific Objectives
The specific objectives of the bibliographic review were the following:
(1) Objective 1
To identify practices and experiences on entry and exit screening referring to travelers worldwide
by using the evidence found in the literature and reports published by competent authorities.
(2) Objective 2
To identify the lessons learnt from entry and exit screening referring to travelers at points of
entry worldwide by using the evidence found in the literature and reports published by competent
authorities or international organizations.
(3) Objective 3
To critically appraise the evidence for the public health impact and/or cost-effectiveness of entry
and exit screening measures implemented on a routine basis or ad hoc basis to travelers worldwide.
2.2.3. Search Strategy
(1) Search topic and concepts
The research topic concerns the public health impact, the cost-effectiveness and the practices and
experiences for implementing entry or exit screening among travelers for infectious diseases at ports,
airports, and ground crossings, by using different assessment methods.
The search concepts used for the above-mentioned topic are: (a) public health event: infectious
diseases in humans, (b) type of measure: entry screening or exit screening, (c) population of interest:
travelers (crew and passengers) crossing borders, (d) setting: points of entry: airport, port, ground
crossing, (e) outcomes: cost-effectiveness, public health impact.
For the purposes of this bibliographic review, the following definitions have been used for “entry
screening” and “exit screening” terms:
(a). “Entry screening” are the public health measures implemented at points of entry (ports,
airports, ground crossings) on travelers (crew and passengers) arriving to a country, with the purpose to
assess the exposure to a biological agent (bacterium, virus, parasite) and/or the presence of symptoms.
Entry screening is part of the international and domestic policies of competent authorities to control
disease spread and to minimize impact on travel and trade, which can be severely affected by absence
of adequate measures or lack of capacity to implement these measures [17].
(b). “Exit screening” are the public health measures implemented at points of entry (ports, airports,
ground crossings) on travelers (crew and passengers) departing from a country, with the purpose to
assess the exposure to a biological agent (bacterium, virus, parasite) and/or the presence of symptoms.
Exit screening is part of the international and domestic policies of competent authorities to control
disease spread and to minimize impact on travel and trade, which can be severely affected by absence
of adequate measures or lack of capacity to implement these measures [17].
(2) Search resources and terms
PubMed and Scopus were searched to identify relevant publications in peer-reviewed journals.
The search terms used are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. Search terms.
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(Biological OR Biochemical OR Bacteriological OR Viral OR Microbiological OR Pathogen OR Public health
risk OR Public health hazard OR Public health danger OR Hygiene OR Threat OR Exposure OR Pandemic OR
Epidemic OR SARS OR H1N1 OR Flu OR Ebola OR Zika OR Plague OR Disease OR Influenza OR Infection OR
Infectious OR Contagious OR Contagion OR Contamination OR Sick OR Sickness OR Illness OR Ailment)
AND (Exit/entry screening OR Entry/exit screening OR Entry screening OR Exit screening OR Entry and exit
screening OR Exit and Entry screening OR Border measure OR Border control OR Health assessment OR
Health check) AND (Patient OR Ill OR Sick OR Unhealthy OR Unwell OR Infected OR Affected OR Exposed
OR Symptomatic OR Case OR Human OR Person OR Individual OR People OR Consumer OR Client OR
Passenger OR Traveler OR Traveler OR Crew OR Refugee OR Migrant OR Immigrant OR Emigrant) AND
(Departure OR Exodus OR Debarkation OR Decampment OR Gateway OR Passageway OR Arrival OR
Embarkation OR Checkpoint OR Airport OR Aerodrome OR Airdrome OR Air station OR Air terminal OR
Flight terminal OR Aviation terminal OR Airfield OR Landing field OR Landing place OR Seaport OR Port OR
Harbor OR Harbour OR Dock OR Pier OR Marine terminal OR Anchorage OR Port of embarkation OR Rail
terminal OR Bus terminal OR Taxi OR Ground crossing OR Land crossing OR Land-crossing OR Border
crossing OR Frontier OR Terminal)
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To identify the relevant grey literature the following websites were searched: WHO (headquarters,
regional offices), European Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Public Health Agencies and Surveillance Centers of EU/EEA
MS and non-EU EU/EEA countries and the following organizations: International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO), International Air Transport Association (IATA), Collaborative Arrangement for
the Prevention and Management of Public Health Events in Civil Aviation (CAPSCA), Airport Council
International (ACI), Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), International Shipping Federation
(ISF), International Union of Railways (UIC), Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage
by Rail (OTIF), Organisation for Cooperation between Railways (OSJD), International Rail Transport
Committee (CIT), European Rail Research Advisory Council (ERRAC). A detailed list of all websites
searched is included in Appendix A (Table A1). In addition, the reference lists from the relevant articles
(hand search) was conducted and the eligible articles that were identified were included in the study.
Moreover, websites of WHO and of national public health institutes were searched in order to
identify publicly available surveillance data about the number of cases of the diseases targeted by the
screening measures and reported during the period of entry/exit screening measure implementation in
the country. These were used to make comparisons with the number of confirmed cases identified
through the entry screening measures.
Additionally, the WHO website was searched to identify the temporary recommendations issued
by WHO in response to the four above-mentioned PHEIC and recommended measures issued after
other emergent public health events. Data from the WHO relevant reports were extracted about the
timeframe of recommended screening measure implementation, the methods for screening, and the
areas, as well as the advice for travel restrictions.
Two researchers checked the documents independently (titles, abstracts, full texts) for the
eligibility criteria.
2.2.4. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
(1) Inclusion and exclusion criteria
The inclusion and exclusion criteria used for the bibliographic review are presented in Table 2.
Appendix B presents the questionnaire used to check documents for eligibility criteria.
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Table 2. Inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Inclusion Criteria
1. Articles or reports or other documents published in peer-reviewed journals or national or international
organizations’ publications, from January 2003 until May 2018 that report practices, implementation of
guidelines, experiences, structures, processes, evaluation results about national routine or ad hoc entry or
exit screening activities referring to travelers at ports or airports or ground crossings, worldwide.
2. Moreover, articles and documents that include information referring to any of the following (a) to (j) were
included in the literature review:
a. Type of screening (entry, exit)
b. Type of infectious disease or diseases that entry or exit screening was targeting
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were implemented
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has
occurred and its purpose
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, body
temperature checks, technology used)
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology)
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination)
h. Number of cases identified, and total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe,
percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease, and
percentage of persons diagnosed with a different disease from the initially targeted for the specific
timeframe (positive and negative predictive values).
i. General massive screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound
country, all travelers directly arriving only from affected countries/areas, nationality of travelers,
travelers in-transit that have called an affected country/area)
j. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening measures or
the cost-effectiveness of methods applied
Exclusion criteria
1. Articles that refer to migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers were excluded, except when related to a
global health emergency response.
2. Articles that refer to screening of diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis that were not part of a global
health emergency response.
3. Articles that described entry or exit screening measures that were part of response to a specific outbreak
on board an airplane or a ship and not part of a country response to a global health threat.
4. Articles for which the full text is not available in English, German, Dutch, or Greek were also excluded,
unless the abstract clearly provided the information needed for data extraction.
2.2.5. Analysis of the Literature
(1) Quality of articles appraisal
The quality of articles included in the review were assessed based on completing the
inclusion criteria.
(2) Data extraction
Specific questions were used by the two researchers to systematically extract the data from
the articles, as shown in the questionnaire presented in Appendix C. Two researchers extracted
independently data from the eligible articles. The following data were extracted from the papers/reports
that fulfilled the inclusion/exclusion criteria of the review:
a. Type of screening (entry, exit)
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting
c. Type of points of entry: airports, ports, ground crossings
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event
has occurred
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening (primary, secondary, questionnaire, body temperature,
technology used etc.)
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras etc.)
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination)
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h. Number of cases identified and the total numbers of travelers screened
i. Percentage of persons positive to screening finally diagnosed
j. Percentage of persons diagnosed with a different disease from the initially targeted
k. The applied protocol for diagnosis and management of cases
l. Health measures applied to the traveler and the environment
m. General screening or targeted screening: outbound country, travelers directly arriving from
affected countries, nationality, travelers in-transit
n. Inter-sectorial collaboration and coordination processes
o. Involved officers: public health officers, ministry officers, regional health system, national health
system, NGOs, else
p. Concrete example of entry/exit screening
q. Practices, experiences, and lessons learnt reported
r. Challenges reported (limitations, failures, mishaps)
s. Bad practices reported
t. Methods used to assess the public health impact of the entry/exit screening and their result
u. Methods used to appraise the cost-effectiveness of screening method and results
v. Evaluation of method results: sensitivity, specificity, false positive/negative (of screening method),
positive and negative predictive values
w. Decision-making level: public health officers, ministry officers, regional, national, intersectoral
collaboration, health, and border authorities
x. Communication channels
y. Notification practices between neighboring and possibly affected countries
z. Specific timeframe referred and duration
2.2.6. Ethical Considerations
This bibliographic review concerns a literature review of already published material, and therefore
ethics approval was not required.
3. Results
3.1. Results of Scoping Search
The scoping search identified 82 scientific articles, six documents/reports from public health
agencies of countries and 26 guidelines/reports from international organizations.
In total, 114 identified documents of scoping research can be categorized into the following
categories:
(a) Assessment for imported cases notification of infectious diseases
(b) Dengue entry screening at airports
(c) Preparedness and response planning for Ebola Virus Disease
(d) Entry/exit screening measures for Ebola Virus Disease experience
(e) Studies about evolution and predictions of Ebola Virus Disease spread
(f) Entry/exit screening measures for infectious diseases
(g) Influenza
(h) Pandemic influenza preparedness
(i) International air travel and infectious diseases
(j) Preparedness planning for infectious disease
(k) Screening measures at ground crossing
(l) Sever Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(m) Zika Virus Disease
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The list of documents identified through the scoping search can be found in Appendix D, and is
presented in thematic sections and in alphabetical order including authors, title, and year of publication.
Twenty-four articles in Appendix D were also identified through the systematic bibliographic review
search as described in Section 2.2.3.
Table 3 summarizes the degree of success of the primary objective of screening measures in
identifying ill or exposed travelers, the limitations and both the beneficial and adverse concomitant
effects of entry and exit screening at points of entry for SARS, Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and
EVD, as reported by the authors. Results concerning measures implemented as part of long-term
measures for Dengue fever and not as a response to emergencies are not presented in Table 3.
Screening measures as reported in the published literature were decided to be applied at the specific
setting and situation, and generalizing conclusions was not considered to be appropriate [14]. Disease
virulence, type, and severity of symptoms, length of incubation period, proportion of asymptomatic
carriers, transmissibility, period of communicability, and mode of transmission were factors that
determined the degree of success of screening measures depending on the disease, as well as the extent
and evolution of the outbreak and the phase that measures were applied [18]. Finally, the country
characteristics seemed to play a role such as whether the country was an island country or shared
borders or had direct connections of flights or ship itineraries with affected countries [19]. For the
previously mentioned reasons, no general conclusions about the impact of entry or exit screening
for all infectious diseases could be drawn, and appraisal of impact should be done considering each
specific disease and the context of screening measure implementation.
Data from the scoping search were used to develop the algorithm for making evidence-based
decisions in implementing entry and exit screening measures (Appendix E).
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Table 3. Degree of success, limitations and concomitant effects of entry and exit screening at points of entry for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Influenza
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 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
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Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot detect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate health monitoring and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
areas by regular commercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
[8,9,13,23]
Entry screening measures did not
detect any onfirmed SARS cases in
Australia, Canada, and Singapore.
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09
· Screening cannot detect incubating or
asymptomatic travelers
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Bene icial Adverse 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cann t detect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9]
 The de facto point of en ry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about sc eening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
un erstood by pass ngers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screen ng measures may have not 
dissuadi g ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate health monitoring and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
areas by regular commercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
i ported SARS case may have ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measure   ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 




· False declarations by passengers about exposure
and disease signs and symptoms
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Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot detect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be th  in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact trac ng 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate health monitoring and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
areas by regular commercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measure   ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
S [8]
· Antipyretic drugs can be used by travelers to
conceal fever
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Sen itivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Sp cificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening mea ure  
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
I fluenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot detect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can b  used by 
travel rs to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positiv  predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 Th  de facto poi t of entry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infect ous diseases was found to be the in-
coun ry, cute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
a nouncements abo t screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures w re not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures ay have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 an  EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informi g the traveler passing throug  the screening points about 
t  public eal h risks and p eventi n measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the trav ler with public healt  authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate health monitori g and prompt referral for care if they 
b came ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill t av lers ‡ [6] 
 Maintaining confidence that ir travel is s f  ˅ E[6] 
 En bling huma itarian and public h alth organizations to sustain trav l to affected 
areas by regul r commercial airline flights, m intaining continued flow of passenger 
raf ic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation f r future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May ha e helped dissuade ill pers ns from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Prese ving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving politi al and social pressure and 
limiting negative ec omic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization f 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High co t of screening 
measur s  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in scre ning 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
S [8]
· Questionnaires aski g about exposure and
ther al scanning mac ines, were non-specific
for SARS
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Be eficial Adverse 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
S nsitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect ny 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot de ect incubating or
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and disease s g s and ymptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 ntipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conceal feve  ˅ S [8] 
 Questi nnaires asking about exposur  
and thermal sca ning machine , were n n-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The freque cy of SARS among 
inter ational pas engers arriving or depa ting 
was low resul ing in low positive pr dictive 
v lue ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry into the 
healthcare system fo  r velers wi h serious 
infectious diseases was found to be th  in-
country, acute c re f cilities (hospital , c inics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 La guage barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill traveler  from attempti g to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening poi ts ab ut 
the public health risks and prevention m asures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public heal h authori ies f r the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate health monitor g and prompt referral for car  if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating r pid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling hum nitarian and ublic health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
areas by regular comm rcial airline flights, maintaining continued flow f passe ger 
traffic and resources eeded for the response to the aff cted region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders nd travel, in luding IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatizati n of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screeni g 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
S [9]
· The frequency of SARS among international
passengers arriving or departing was low
resulting in low positive predictive value
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Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI,
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
S nsitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
E try screening me sures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases i  
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot detect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and di ease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnai es sking about ex osure 
and thermal scanning machi es, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS am ng 
int rnational passenger  arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The d  fact  point of entr  into t  
healthcare system f r travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was fou d to be th  in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and phy icians’ ffices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announce ents about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of travel rs to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public heal h risks and prevention m a ures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate health m nitoring and pr mpt referral for care if they 
bec me ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining co fidence that air travel i  safe ˅ E[6] 
 E abling humanitarian nd public health organizatio s to sustain trav l to affected 
areas by regular commercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow f pa senger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected regio  ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, ross-border coordi ation) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
m asures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
S [9]
· Th de fac o poi t o entry into the healthcare
system for travelers with serious infectious
diseases was found to be the in-country, acute
care facilities (hospitals, clinics, and physicians’
offices) and not the airports
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Influenza A(H1N1)pd 09 
˅ [20,21] 
Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening c nnot detect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers ab ut 
exposure and di eas  signs and symptom  ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be u d by 
travelers to con e l fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scanning machines, were n n-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passenger  arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of traveler  to be used if needed for c ntact tr cing 
or public he lth observatio  purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
th  public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate h alth monito ing and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 F c l tati g rapid and appropriate cli ical care for ill tr velers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining c nfidence that air t avel is s fe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling hu anita ian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
areas by regular commercial airli e flights, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources n ed d for th  response to the aff cted region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affect d countries, laid th  oundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
syst ms, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Pre erving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measu e   ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
S [9]
· Language barriers—flight announcem nts
about screening measures and requests for
declaring exposures were not understood by
passengers
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Degree of Success in 




B neficial Adv r e
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
Se sitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificit : 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Scre ning annot detect incubati g or 
a ymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exp sure and disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic rugs can be used by 
travel rs to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Q estionna r  asking about ex os re 
and thermal scanning machines, were no -
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS a ong 
int rnational p ssengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting i  low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de f cto point of entry into the 
healt car  system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
an  physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 O taining contact nformati  of tra l rs to be used if needed fo  contact tra ing 
or public he lth observatio  purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating  informi g the traveler passing through the screening points about 
th  public h alth risks an  prevention mea ures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the tr veler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
ncubation period to facilitate health monitoring a d prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid a d appropriate clinical care for ill tr velers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is s fe ˅ E[6]
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain tra el to affect d 
areas by regular co mercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High c t of cr eni g 
measure   ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
S [8]
· Exit screening mea u s may have not
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to
return home ‡ S [25]
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD
· Obtaining contact information of travelers to be
used if needed for contact tracing or public health
observation purposes
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, x 9 of 65 
 
Table 3. Degree of success, limitations and concomitant effects of entry and exit screening at points of entry for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Influenza Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 (A(H1N1)pdm09) and Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). 
Degree of Success in 







Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Spec ficity: 99.79%
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
En ry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot detect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Q estionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scanning m hi es, were n-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The f equency of SARS a ong 
int n al passengers arriving or departing 
was low res lti g in low po itive predicti e 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry in o the 
healthcare syst m for traveler  with serious 
infectious diseases was ound o be the in-
coun ry, acute care facilities (hos itals, clinics, 
and physici s’ offices) and not the irports ˅ 
S[9] 
 L ng age b riers—flight 
annou ceme ts about screening measures and 
requ sts f r declarin  expos res were n t 
und rstoo  by pass ng r  ˅ S [8] 
 Exit scree ing m as res may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attem ting to 
etur  home ‡ S [25]
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and prevention meas res ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incubati n period to facilit te health m nitoring and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enab ing hum nitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
areas by regular commercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
r l t d to border  and travel, includi g IHR ore capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped di suade ill ersons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major econ mic, social and intern tional impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measur   ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 




· Educating and informing the traveler passing
through the screening points about the public health
risks and prevention measures
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B neficial Adverse 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
S nsitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
c nfirm d SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cann t d tect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and dis ase signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positiv  predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry i o th  
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infecti us diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hos itals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcement  about screening measures and 
requ sts for declaring exposures were not 
underst od by pass ngers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screeni g measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting t  
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining o tact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public h alth authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilit te h alth monitoring and prompt referral for c re if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriat  clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence th t air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enab i g humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
reas by regular commercial airline flights, mainta ing continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundatio  for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coo dination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public co idence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limi ng negative conomic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major econom c, s cial and inter ational impact which even a single 
imp rted SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
E [6]
· Linking the raveler with public health authorities
for the duration of the incubation period to facilitate
health monitoring and prompt referral for care if
they became ill
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Influe za A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
Sensitivit : 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
pecificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensit v ty: 0%  
pecificity: 99.79%
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
di  ot det c  a y 
confi med SARS cas s in 
A stralia, Canada, and 
S ngapore.  
Influenz  A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot detect incub ting or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS
 False declarations b  passengers about 
exposure and dise se signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be u ed by 
travelers to c nceal ev r ˅ S [8] 
 Ques io nair  asking about xposure 
and ther al scann ng machines, were non-
s cifi f r SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
nternational passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulti  in low positive pr dictive 
v lue ˅ S [9] 
 The de fa t  point o  entry into the 
h althcare sy em r velers with serious 
i fe tious iseases was found t  be the i -
c unt y, ac e care fa ilities (hospitals, lini s, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 La uage barri rs—flight 
n uncement  bout scre ning me sures and 
requests for declaring exposures wer  not 
u dersto d by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissu ding ill travelers from attempting to 
return ho e ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD
 Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and infor ing the travel r passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and pr vention measures ˅ E[6]
 Linking the travel r with publ c he lth authorities for the duration f the 
incubation peri d to facilit te health monitoring and prom t ref rral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilit ng rapid and appropriate clinical car  f r ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maint ining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organiza i ns to sustain travel to affected 
areas by reg lar commercia  airli e flights, mai taining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the re ponse t  the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future r construction efforts 
related to b rders and tr vel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill per ns from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade r strictio s ˅ S[8] 
 Help av iding major economic, social and internati nal mpact which even a single 
imported SARS c se may hav   ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of s curity ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
E [6]
· Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill
travelers ‡ E [6]
· Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe
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Influenza A(H1N1)pd 09 
˅ [20,21] 
Sens t vity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specific ty: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: %  
Spe i i y: 99 79%
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect ny 
co f med SARS c ses i  
Australia, Canad , and 
S gap re. 
Influe za A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot tect incub ting or 
a atic tr velers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
x o ure and disease signs and symp oms ˅ S
[8] 
 A tipyr t c drugs can be used by 
traveler  to con eal fev  ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
a d thermal scanning machines, were non-
specifi  for SARS ˅S [9] 
 The freq ency of SARS among
interna io al passengers arriving or d parting 
as l w resulting in low pos tive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de fact point of entry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was fo nd to be the in-
country, acute care fa ilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[  
 Language barri s—fl ght 
announcemen s about screening m asure  and 
r quests  declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit scree ing measures may have not 
dissuading ill travel rs fr m attempting to 
re urn home ‡ S [25] 
Influenz  A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact inform  of travel rs to b  used if n eded for contact tracing 
or public health observa io  purpos s ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and infor ing he traveler passing through the scr ening points about 
the public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incuba ion period to facilitate health monitoring and prompt refer al f r care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6]
 Facilitating r pid and appr pr ate clinical care for ill tr velers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintai ing c n idence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling hum itarian and public health organizations to sustain ravel to affected
are s by regular commercial airline fl hts, maintaining continued flow of pas enger 
raffic and resources needed for the response to the affected regi  ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future r construction efforts 
related to bo ders and trav l, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-bord r coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have help d diss de ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preservi g pu lic confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic conseq ences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
t velers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
E [6]
· Enabling h mani arian and public health
organizations to sustain trav l to affected areas by
regular commercial airline flights, maintaining
continued flow of passenger traffic and resources
needed for the response to the affected region
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Sensit vity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitiv ty: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screenin  measure  
d d n t de ect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Aust alia, Canada, and 
Si gapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening ca not detect incubating or 
asy ptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure nd disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
trav lers o conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires sking about exposure 
and thermal sc nning machines, were non-
pecific for SARS  ˅S [9]
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriv ng r departing 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry into the 
healthc re system for travelers with serious 
infectious disease  was found to be the in-
c untry, acute car  facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offic ) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language bar iers—flight
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate health monitoring and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
areas by regular commercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coor inati ) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 




· In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for
future reconstruction efforts relate to borders and
travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional
surveillance systems, cross-border coordination)
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Influenza A(H1N1) dm09 
˅ [20,21] 
Sensiti ity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Se sitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Scre ning cannot det ct incubating or 
symptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure a d disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
traveler  to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about xposur  
and thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or eparting 
was low resulting in l w positive predictive 
valu  ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto poin  of entry i to the 
healthcare system for travele s with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A( 1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public ealth observation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educ ting and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
i cubation period to facilitate health monitoring and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
areas by regular commercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affect d c untries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordinati ) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 




· May have helped dissuade ill persons from
traveling by air ‡ S [25]
· Preserving public confidence
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Table 3. Degree of success, limitations a d c  e f cts of entry and exit s ree ing at point  of ntry for Severe Acute Respir tory Syndr m  (SARS), Influenza Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 (A(H1N1)pdm09) and Ebol  Virus Disease (EVD). 
D gree of Success in 
Id ntifyi  Ill r Expos  
Travele s 
Limitat o s 
Concomitant Effects 
B n ficial Adverse 
I fl e z  A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% C , 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sen itivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
ARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
I flu nz  A(H1N1)pd 09 
 S reening cann  detect ncubati g or 
asympt matic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
expos re and dise se signs a d sy ptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
t avelers to con e l fever ˅ S [8] 
 Qu stionnaires aski g ab ut exposure 
and th rmal sca ing m chines, were -
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The f equency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
valu  ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto poi t of entry into th  
he lthcare system f r trav lers with se ious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
In lue za A(H1N1)pdm09 a d EVD 
 Obta ning contact informa ion of ra lers be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health observati  purp s s ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the scr ening points about 
the public he lth risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health uthorit s for the duration of the 
incubation per od to facilitate he lth onitori g and pr mpt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilita ng rapid and approp iate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 M intaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 E bli g humanitarian and public health organizati ns to susta  travel to affected 
areas by regular commercial airline flig ts, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and reso ces needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
S [8,9,29], relieving
political and social pressure and limiting negative
economic consequences from travel and trade
restrictions
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(H1N1) 2009 (A(H1N1)pdm09) an  Ebol Vi us Diseas (EVD). 
Degree of Success in 
Identifying Ill or Exposed 
Travelers 
Limitations 




Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Se sitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)p m09 
 Screening cannot detect incubating r 
ymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
False declarations by p ss ngers about 
exposur  and disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conce l fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scanning mach es, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
I fluenza A(H1N1) dm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining co t ct information of travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
r public health obs rv tion urposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
EVD 
 Ed ting and informing the traveler passing thro gh the screening points about 
the public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the travel r with p blic health authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate health monitoring and prompt referral f r care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Fac litating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
area  by regular commercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related t  borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting egative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of s reening 
measure   ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
S [8]
· Help avoiding major economic, social and
international impact which even a single imported
SARS case may have
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(H1N1) 2009 (A(H1N1)pdm09) and Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). 
D gree of Success in 





Influ nza A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
S nsitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Sp cificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening can ot detect incubating or 
asymptomatic trav lers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 Fals  declarations by passengers about 
exposure and disease sig s and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departi g 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announce ents about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining co tact information of ravelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public h alth observation purpos s ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informi g t e traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and pr vention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
i cubation period to facilit te hea th monitoring and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
are s by regular commercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of passe g r 
traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the publi  a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 




· May give to the public a false sense of security
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(H1N1) 2009 (A(H1N1)pdm09) and Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). 
Degree of Success in 




Ben ficial Adverse 
Infl enza A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
S nsitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Austr a, C nada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot detect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and disease signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs ca be used by 
travelers to conceal f ver ˅ S [8] 
 Que tionnaires asking about exposure 
an thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
internatio al pas eng rs ar ivi g or departing 
was low resulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry into the 
healthcare syst m for travelers with serious 
infectious diseas s was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicia s’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
r quests for d cla ing exposures were not 
understood by passeng r  ˅ S [8] 
 Exit scr ening m asures may have not
dissuading ill trav ers from at empting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtaining contact information f travelers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public heal h bservatio  rposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Ed cati g and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Li king the traveler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate h alth m nitoring and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid and appr priat  clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that ir travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affected 
reas by regular commercial airline flights, maintai i  continued flow of passenger 
traffic an  resourc s need d for the response to the affected regi n ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 I  EVD-affected countries, laid the fou datio  for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, incl ding IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting egative economic conseq en es from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help a oiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case y have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
m asures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
E [30]
· Stigmatization of travel rs under public health
observation
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Degree of Success in 





Influe za A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
Se s tivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
VD ˄ [22] 
S i ivity:   
Specific ty: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did ot detect ny 
c nfirmed SARS cases in 
Australi , Canada, nd 
Singapor .  
Influenz  A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Scr e ing cannot detect incubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declarati ns by passengers about 
exposure and dis as  signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
t avelers t  conceal fever ˅ S [8]
 Que ionnai e  askin  ab ut xp sure 
and thermal scanning machi es, w re non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
inter ational pas nge s rrivi g r part  
was low esulting in low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de fa to point of ntry into the 
healt c re syste  for travele s with serious 
in ectious diseases w  found to b he in-
cou try, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
a d physicians’ offices) and not the a rports ˅
S[9] 
 Language barrier —flight 
announcem nts about screening measures and 
reque ts for declari g exposures wer not 
understood by passe gers ˅ S [8]
 Exit scr ening measures may ve not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempti g to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtai ing contact information of tr velers t  be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public h alth ob ervation purpo s ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and i formi g h  tra eler p ssing through the s r ening points about 
the public health risk  a d prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the travel  wi h public health authoriti s for the duration of th  
incubation period to facilitat  health onitoring and prompt referral for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilit ting rapid a d ppropriate clinical are for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintai ing confiden  that air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 E abling humanitaria nd public health orga izations to sus ai  travel to affected 
a eas by regular commercial airl ne flights, maintaining continu d flow of passenger 
tr ffic a d resources needed for the response to the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected cou tries, laid the foundation for future reconst uction efforts 
lated to borders and trav l, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cr ss-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
SARS 
 May h ve helped dissuade ill ersons from traveli  by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserv ng public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
measures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 




· High cost of scr ening measures
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Degre of Success in 







S nsitivi y: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
S ecificity: 99.79% 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screeni g measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influ nza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening can ot d tect inc ating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 F lse declarati ns by passengers about 
exposure and disease signs a d symptoms ˅ S
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs ca  be used by 
travelers to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires sking about exposur  
a d thermal scanning machines, were on-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS mong 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low ositive redictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of e try into the 
healthcare system for travelers with seri s
infe tious diseases was found to be t e in-
country, c t  care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and ot he irports ˅ 
[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about scree ng measu es and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passenger  ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures ma h ve ot 
dissuading ill travelers from attempti  to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influe za A(H1N1)pdm09 a d EVD 
 Obtaining contact formation of trav lers to be used if needed for contact tracing 
or public health obs rvation purposes ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler passing through the screening points about 
the public health risks and pr vention measu es ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the trav ler with public health authorities for the duration of the 
incubation period to facilitate heal  monitoring and prompt referral for care if t y 
became i l ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid nd appropriate clinical care for ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaini g confidence th  air travel is safe ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian and public health organizations to ustain travel to affected 
areas by regular commercial airline flights, mai t i ing continued flow of passenger 
traffic and resources n eded for the response to the aff cted region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundati n for future r construction efforts 
rela ed to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., regional surveillance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving olitical and social pressure and
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restr ctions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding ajor economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public heal h 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of screening 
  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in scre ning 
measures reduces the 
re ources from other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
S [8,9,13]
· Inves ng in screening measures reduces th
resources from other effective measures
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Sensitivi y: 6.67  (95% CI, 
1.4 %–18.27%) 
Sp cificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Ent y scre ning measures 
did not d tect any 
c nfirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening c nnot detect inc bating or 
asy ptom tic trav lers ˅ I [24] 
SARS 
 False declaration  by passengers about 
exposure and dis e signs and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 A tipyretic dr gs can be u ed by 
travelers to conc al fev r ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires asking about exposure 
and thermal scannin  machin s, wer  non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency f SARS among 
internation l passengers arriv ng or departing 
was low resulti g n low positive predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point f ent  i to the 
healthcar  system for travelers with serious 
infect ous iseases was found to be the in-
cou try, acute care facilitie  ( ospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for decl ring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
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 May give to the public a 
false sense of security ˅ E[30]  
 Stigmatization of 
travelers under public health 
observati n ˅ E [31] 
SAR  
 High cost of screening 
  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in scre ning 
measures reduces the 
resources fro  other effective 
measures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
[9,23]
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, x 9 of 65 
 
Table 3. Degree of success, limitations and concomitant effects of entry nd ex t creeni g at po nts of try f r S v r  Ac te Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Influenza Pand mic 
(H1N1) 2009 (A(H1N1)pdm09  and Ebola Virus Di e se (EVD). 
Degree of Success in 
Identifying Ill or Exposed 
Travelers 
Limitations 
Conco i ant Ef ects 
Beneficial A v rse 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
˅ [20,21] 
Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot detect incub ing or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24] 
SARS
 False d cl rations by passengers about 
exposure and disease signs a  s mptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can be used by 
travelers to conceal f ver ˅ S [8] 
 Questionnaires ask g about expo ure 
a d thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low ositiv  predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point of entry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospitals, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) a d not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Inf enza A(H1N1)pd 09 and EVD
 Obt ini g contact informa  of trav rs to be u ed if n e d for co tac  tra i g 
r p blic he lth bservation purp ses ˅ E,I [6,26] 
 
EVD 
 Educ ting and infor ing the tr vel r passing t rough th  screening points bou  
th  public h alth risks and prevention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Link ng the aveler with publ  health u horities for the duration of th  
i c bation period to facilita e h alth monitoring a d pro pt referr l for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitati g rapid and appropriat  cli ical ca e fo  ill travelers ‡ E[6] 
 Maint ining onfidence t at ir travel is af  ˅ E[6] 
 E abling humanitarian and public health organizations to sustain travel to affe ted 
areas by regular co mercial airline flights, maintaining continued flow of pass ng r 
traff c and resources needed for the r sponse o th  affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to bord rs an  travel, including IHR cor  capacities (e.g., region l surveillance 
systems, cross-bo der coordin t n) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from tr v ling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving publ c onfidence ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restricti ns ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and interna ional impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May give to the public a 
fal  sens  of s c rity ˅ E[30]  
S igmatization of 
travele s under p bl c health 
observati n ˅ E [31] 
SARS
 Hi h cost of screening 
meas re   ˅S [8,9,13] 
 Investing in screening 
measures ed ces the 
resources from other effective 
easures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
: Exit screening, ‡: Entry and Exit screening,
Int. J. Environ. Res. Publ c Health 2019, 16, x 9 of 65
 
Table 3. Degree of success, limitations and concom tant effects of entry and exit screening at points of entry for Severe Acute Respir t y Syndrome (SARS), Influenza Pand mic
(H1N1) 2009 (A(H1N1)pdm09) and Ebola Viru Disease (EVD). 
Degree of Success in 
Identifying Ill or Exposed 
Travelers 
Limitations 




Sensitivity: 6.67% (95% CI, 
1.40%–18.27%) 
Specificity: 99.10% (95% CI, 
99.00%–100.00%) 
 
EVD ˄ [22] 
Sensitivity: 0%  
Specificity: 99.79% 
 
SARS ˅ [8,9,13,23] 
Entry screening measures 
did not detect any 
confirmed SARS cases in 
Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore.  
Influ nza A(H1N1)pdm09 
 Screening cannot detect i cubating or 
asymptomatic travelers ˅ I [24]
SARS 
 False declarations by passengers about 
exposure and disease sig s and symptoms ˅ S 
[8] 
 Antipyretic drugs can b  used by 
travelers to conceal fever ˅ S [8] 
 Qu stionnaire  aski g about xposure 
and thermal scanning machines, were non-
specific for SARS  ˅S [9] 
 The frequency of SARS among 
international passengers arriving or departing 
was low resulting in low positiv  predictive 
value ˅ S [9] 
 The de facto point f entry into the 
healthcare system for travelers with serious 
infectious diseases was found to be the in-
country, acute care facilities (hospit ls, clinics, 
and physicians’ offices) and not the airports ˅ 
S[9] 
 Language barriers—flight 
announcements about screening measures and 
requests for declaring exposures were not 
understood by passengers ˅ S [8] 
 Exit screening measures may have not 
dissuading ill travelers from attempting to 
return home ‡ S [25] 
Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 and EVD 
 Obtainin  contact information o  t avel s t  b  used f eeded f r c ntact tr ing 
r public healt  observa ion purpos s ˅ E,I [ , 6] 
 
EVD 
 Educating and informing the traveler p ssi g through the screening points about 
the public health risks nd pr vention measures ˅ E[6] 
 Linking the traveler with public health authorities f  t  d rati  f th  
incub tion period to fac li t  heal h mon t ring and prompt eferr l for care if they 
became ill ˅ E[6] 
 Facilitating rapid nd app op iate clinical are for ill trav ler  ‡ E[6] 
 Maintaining confidence that air trav l is saf  ˅ E[6] 
 Enabling humanitarian nd ublic health organizatio s to sustain travel to affect d 
areas by regular commercial airline flights, maint ining continu d flow of ssenger 
traffic and re ources ne de  for the r sponse t  the affected region ˄ E [16,27,28]  
 In EVD-affected countries, laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts 
related to borders and travel, including IHR core capacities (e.g., re ional surve llance 
systems, cross-border coordination) ˄ E[16] 
 
SARS 
 May have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air ‡ S [25] 
 Preserving public confid nce ˅S[8,9,29], relieving political and social pressure and 
limiting negative economic consequences from travel and trade restrictions ˅ S[8] 
 Help avoiding major economic, social and international impact which even a single 
imported SARS case may have  ˅S [23] 
  
EVD 
 May giv  to the p bl c  
false sense of securit ˅ E[30]  
 Stig a ization of
trav ler  under public heal h 
observation ˅ E [31] 
SARS 
 High cost of scr eni g 
easures  ˅S [8,9,13] 
 In esting in screening 
measures reduces the 
resources from other effective 
me sures ˅ S [9,23] 
  
: Entry screening “S”: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS),”I”: 2009 Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) (influenza A(H1N1)pdm09), “E”:
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD).
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4638 11 of 53
3.2. Results of Systematic Bibliographic Review
After full-text review the eligibility criteria were fulfilled by 27 articles (24 identified through
databases searched and three after checking the reference lists of full-text articles). Figure 1 presents
the flow chart of the review process with articles retrieved, the number of articles excluded and the
reason for exclusion, and finally the number of articles that fulfilled the inclusion criteria.
The two researchers independently reviewed and extracted data from the 27 documents by using
a standardized questionnaire (Appendix C).
As shown in Table 4, from the 27 articles, 25 reported entry screening measures [6–11,15,20,21,23,
24,26–29,31–40] and five reported exit screening measures [6,9,16,22,28]. Figures 2–4 summarize the
results of entry and exit screening measures by disease and per country.
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3.2.1. Entry and Exit Screening Measures in the Different Types of Point of Entry
(1) Airports
Australia implemented entry screening measures at airports to prevent EVD [31], Influenza
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases [20] and SARS [8]. New Zealand implemented entry screening for
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 at airports [21]. In Canada, entry and exit screening was applied for
SARS [9] and entry screening for EVD at airports [22]. Peru implemented entry screening for Influenza
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 at airports [32]. In China, entry screening took place for Influenza Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 at airports [40]. In Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali, exit screening
was implemented for EVD at airports, seaports and ground crossings [6,16,22,28]. Japan implemented
entry screening for EVD [38] and Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 at airports [24,26,39]. Singapore
applied entry screening for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 at airports [36] and for SARS at airports,
seaports and road entry points [23,29]. Taiwan applied entry screening at airports for SARS [35],
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 [33] and Zika virus disease [7] as an ad hoc measure at airports
in response to public health emergencies. Moreover, entry screening for Dengue [7,10,11,15] and
Chikungunya [7] were implemented as routine measures at airports. Regarding European countries,
Belgium and United Kingdom implemented entry screening at airports for EVD [22,27,37]. Table 4
summarizes the entry and exit screening measures.
(2) Ports
Entry screening measures were implemented at seaports in four countries [8,23,27,29].
Exit screening measures were implemented at seaports for EVD in three counties [16]. A two-level
program was applied at Australia’s seaports for SARS, where the Australian Quarantine and Inspection
Service staff directly contacted the Chief Quarantine Officer to inform of ill passengers [8]. Temperature
checks for SARS were introduced to all of Singapore’s ferry/sea terminals [23,29]. The public health
authorities of Belgium implemented entry screening for EVD at seaports located in priority areas [27]. In
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone exit screening for EVD at seaports included temperature checkpoints,
followed by emergency medical response, on-site isolation and use of personal protective equipment
for staff if necessary [16].
(3) Ground crossings
Two articles [23,29] refer to entry screening measures for SARS implemented at road entry points,
one [16] to exit screening measures for EVD at ground crossings, and two articles [27,37] refer to entry
screening measures at a train station for EVD. Thermal scanners were installed at the road entry points
of Singapore to check the temperatures of all departing and arriving passengers for SARS [23,29].
As reported by Cohen et al., in the land borders of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, simple exit
screening measures involving visual screening for illness at designated official border crossings were
applied for EVD [16]. Due to sparse, understaffed, and under-resourced official border points of entry,
land borders were characterized as “porous” and it was not possible to apply measures similar to
airports. Two articles refer to entry screening measures implemented at the Eurostar terminal/train
station at London St Pancras for EVD [22,37]. Measures included visual and fever screening.
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Table 4. Summary results of studies reviewed including type of screening, point of entry (airports,
ports, ground crossings), infectious disease targeted, and country of measure implementation.
Disease Country
Type of Screening Type of Point of Entry






Australia [8] X - X X -
Singapore [23,29] X - X X X
Taiwan [35] X - X - -
Canada [9] X X X - -
Influenza Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009
Australia [20], China [40],
Japan [24,26,39], New
Zealand [21], Peru [32],
Singapore [36], Taiwan [33]
X - X - -
Vector-borne
diseases
Dengue fever * Taiwan [7,10,11,15] X - X - -
Zika virus disease Taiwan [7] X - X - -
Chikungunya
infection * Taiwan [7] X - X - -
Other Ebola virus disease
Australia [31], Japan [38],
United States [6], Canada
[22]
X - X - -
Belgium [22,27] X - X X -
United Kingdom [22,27,37] X - X X X
Guinea, Liberia, Sierra
Leone [6,16,22,28] - X X X X
Nigeria, Senegal, Mali
[6,16,22,28] - X X - -
* Screening measures for Dengue fever and Chikungunya infection were implemented as part of routine, long-term
public health measures. All other screening measures were implemented on an ad hoc basis in response to public
health emergency events.
3.2.2. Timeframes of Public Health Events and Screening Measure implementation
Table 5 presents the timeframes of public health events, of screening measure implementation,
and of temporary recommendations for screening measures issued by WHO. As presented in Table 5
Since the IHR 2005 entered into force in 2007, temporary recommendations for exit screening measures
have been issued by WHO as part of a set of measures to be implemented in areas affected from
outbreaks. This happened during the EVD epidemic in West Africa in 2014/2015, in the EVD outbreak
in the (Democratic Republic Congo, DRC) in 2018 and during the plague outbreak in Madagascar in
2017 [5]. On the contrary, entry screening measures were not part of WHO temporary recommendations
for the outbreaks of EVD in West Africa, Poliovirus, EVD outbreak in DRC, Middle East respiratory
syndrome (MERS), Yellow fever, Zika virus disease, Plague and the Influenza Pandemic (H1N1)
2009 [5].
3.2.3. Screening Measures on an Ad hoc Basis and as a Routine Measure
In Taiwan entry screening was applied as a response to public health emergencies as well as
on a routine basis. In particular, entry screening was applied for Zika virus disease for a total of 10
months (January to October 2016) [7]. Moreover, entry screening measures in Taiwan are applied
on a routine basis for vector-borne diseases. The articles fulfilling the inclusion criteria reported
results for entry screening routine measures for Chikungunya infection between 2013 and 2016 [7].
Routine entry screening for all inbound travelers for Dengue has been implemented since 2003 and is
ongoing [7,10,11,15].
Only Taiwan implemented entry screening on a routine basis for Dengue and Chikungunya [7,10,11,15].
All other authors reported screening measures on an ad hoc basis in response to an emergency public
health event.
Targeted screening of incoming travelers arriving from affected countries was implemented in five
countries for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 [21,24,26,33,39]. Six countries implemented massive
general screening to all inbound travelers arriving at the airport for SARS and for Influenza Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009, as well as for Dengue fever and Chikungunya infection [8–10,15,20,29,32,35,36,40]. In one
report the type of screening is not clearly described [28].
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Table 5. WHO temporary recommendations for entry and exit screening at points of entry (data in the table were extracted from the reports available from the WHO
IHR (see Appendix F)).
Public Health Event
WHO Emergency Committee WHO Temporary Recommendations
Title Started/Ended
PHEIC Yes/No
(Date) Entry/Exit Screening (Timeframe of
Implementation)




of the Congo (DRC)
10 May 2018/25 July 2018 No IHR Emergency Committee regarding
the Ebola outbreak in 2018
Exit screening
at airports (Mbandaka, Kinshasa), ports on the
Congo river and congregation sites (23/5 to
25/7/2018)
No international travel or trade restrictions
(10/5/2018 to 25/7/2018)
4 August 2018/ongoing No
Exit screening
at defined points of entry in DRC (14/8/2018,
ongoing, latest report on 5/12/2018)
No international travel or trade restrictions




8 August 2014/29 March 2016 Yes
(8/8/2014)
2014–2016 IHR Emergency Committee
for Ebola virus disease
Exit screening
in affected countries *, at international airports,
seaports and major land crossings (8/8/2014 to
29/3/2016)
No general ban on international travel
(8/8/2014 to 18/12/2015)
No restrictions on travel and trade with
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (29/3/2016)
MERS 9 July 2013/ongoing, latest reporton 3 September 2015 No
IHR Emergency Committee concerning
Middle East respiratory syndrome
coronavirus
No No international travel or trade restrictions(17/6/2015, ongoing, latest report on 3/9/2015)
Influenza Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 25 April 2009/10 August 2010 Yes (25/4/2009)
IHR Emergency Committee concerning
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 No
Countries should not close borders or restrict
international traffic and trade; If ill, it is
prudent to delay international travel (if ill
after travel seek care) (25/4/2009 to 10/8/2010)
Plague 4 October 2017/4 December 2017 No WHO Regional Office for Africa
No No international travel or trade restrictions(4/10/2017)
Exit screening
at International Airport in Antananarivo,
Madagascar (9/10 to 4/12/2017)
No international travel or trade restrictions
(4/10/2017 to 4/12/2017)
Poliomyelitis 5 May 2014/ongoing Yes (5/5/2014)
IHR Emergency Committee concerning
ongoing events and context involving
transmission and international spread of
poliovirus
No No international travel or trade restrictions(5/5/2014 to 30/11/2018, ongoing)
SARS 27 March 2003/24 June 2003 No WHO Scientific Research AdvisoryCommittee SARS
Exit screening
in affected countries (27/3 to 24/6/2003)
No international travel or trade restrictions
(27/3/2003 to 24/6/2003)
Yellow fever 31 August 2016/16 May 2017 No IHR Emergency Committee on yellowfever No
No international travel or trade restrictions
(31/8/2016 to 16/5/2017)
Zika virus disease 1 February 2016/18 November 2016 Yes(1/2/2016)
IHR Emergency Committee on Zika
virus disease and observed increase in
neurological disorders and neonatal
malformations
No No international travel or trade restrictions(1/2/2016 to 18/11/2016)
*Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. website: https://www.who.int/ihr/en/.
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3.2.4. Decision-Making
Screening measures for SARS in Canada were decided by Health Canada [9] and in Singapore
by the Ministerial Committee on SARS chaired by the Minister for Home Affairs [29]. In Japan,
concerning Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and EVD, decisions were taken at the level of the Ministry
of Health, Labor, and Welfare, while the response and measures of relevant ministries and agencies
were coordinated at the Intergovernmental Coordination Meeting on EVD measures, chaired by the
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management [26,38,39]. In New Zealand, the Ministry of
Health and the Auckland Regional Public Health Service [21] and in Taiwan, the Central Epidemic
Command Center were responsible for decision-making regarding the Influenza Pandemic (H1N1)
2009, Zika virus disease and Dengue fever screening measures [7,15,33].
3.2.5. Authorities Involved in Implementing Entry/Exit Screening Measures
Authorities and officers involved in the implementation of screening measures were ministries of
health, public health officers/inspectors or public health emergency staff, custom, and border control
staff, airlines, airport, and port authorities, emergency medical service units at airports/ports, airline
check-in agents, flight crews, airport ambulance services, physicians, nurses, quarantine officers,
regional authorities and communities and fire brigade [6,7,9,20,21,26].
3.2.6. Contact Tracing, Data Management, and Communication Flows
Health Canada introduced a traveler contact information form that collected contact details and
information on location of stay that all inbound passengers were asked to fill in before arrival, when
implementing entry screening for SARS [9]. Upon landing, all forms were collected from passengers by
Health Canada personnel and retained for possible contact tracing if a case was subsequently identified.
The traveler contact information form is believed to have reduced the time for securing the manifest
from weeks to two days.
During entry screening measures for EVD implemented in the US, contact information for inbound
travelers from affected countries was entered into a database and transmitted to states through CDC’s
Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) that is a secure notification system [6]. As part of entry
screening in Australia for EVD, the Notifiable Conditions Information Management System database
was used [31].
In Taiwan, all data and diagnostic results of cases of Dengue fever identified through screening
were reported through the web-based National Surveillance System, for later tracking and management
of cases [10].
During entry and exit screening measures applied in Canada for SARS, Health Canada monitored
the spread of SARS via the WHO-Health Canada Global Public Health Intelligence Network and
regular communications with other international and Canadian provincial and territorial public health
agencies documenting travel and illness histories of possible SARS cases who departed Canada and
whose illnesses were diagnosed and reported internationally [9].
As part of entry screening measures in Taiwan for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, information
of suspected cases was delivered to the local health bureaus via the Internet Information System for
subsequent follow-up [33].
In China information was entered into an internet-based surveillance system; all community
hospitals were authorized to access the system [40].
3.2.7. Screening Protocols and Accompanying Measures
Regarding the screening protocols applied, both entry and exit screening included an initial
assessment of exposure through completion of a questionnaire, temperature measurement, and if
needed, secondary assessment by medical staff and laboratory testing. Screening measures were
conducted at the point of entry facilities. One article reported that primary screening measures were
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conducted on board the aircraft [26]. Some countries combined screening measures for symptoms and
exposure with risk communication and instructions strategies, and by offering equipment for body
temperature measurement (Table 6).
As far as exit screening for EVD is concerned, visual screening, health questionnaires and
temperature measurement (non-contact infrared thermometer) were applied [6,16,22,28].
Similarly, entry screening for EVD included screening of travelers by asking questions about
symptoms and potential exposure risks and temperature checks [6,16,22,28]. Entry screening measures
for EVD in the US were combined with an educational and informing strategy to travelers passing
through the screening points [6]. Each traveler arriving from an affected country received a Check
and Report Ebola (CARE) kit that included health education materials, a thermometer, and ways to
connect with their state or local health department, including a prepaid cell phone [28]. In Australia,
a separate EVD-specific arrivals card was distributed [31].
For exposure and/or symptoms assessment, travelers were asked to complete a questionnaire [6,7,
9–11,16,20,22,23,26,27,29,31,35,37–40]. In addition to this, temperature measurements were conducted
either with handheld non-contact infrared thermometers, or thermal imaging scanners [6–11,15,16,
20,22–24,26,27,29,33–40]. One article referring to entry screening for Zika virus disease [7] describes
that travelers underwent visual assessment, and infrared cameras were used to detect abnormal
temperatures. An ear thermometer was used to recheck temperature when necessary.
Visual screening for the presence of symptoms was also part of the screening protocols [6–11,
16,20–23,26,27,33–35,37,38,40] and/or rapid diagnostic tests [7,10,24,26,39] to identify suspected cases.
Finally, medical and laboratory assessments were conducted for suspected travelers [6–11,15,16,20–
24,26,27,29,31–36,38–40]. Methods for entry and exit screening, accompanying measures, response
measures and laboratory diagnosis are summarized in Table 6.
In all but one article included in the literature review, entry screening to in-transit travelers has
not been addressed. Those in-transit travelers were screened during entry screening measures for
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 at the airport in Japan, either at the aircraft cabin or at the quarantine
station at the terminal [39].
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Table 6. Screening methods and accompanying measures.
Country/PoE/Type of
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Table 6. Cont.
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TMD: Temperature measuring device, CDC: Center for Disease Control and Prevention, RT-PCR: Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction, SARS: Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome. * (-) Not specified, # from 28 April to 21 May 2009, ‡ from 22 May to 18 June 2009.
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3.2.8. Technology for Body Temperature Measurement
Temperature measuring devices used to measure body temperature of travelers were electronic
handheld or fixed/stationary non-contact thermometers, and ear or oral thermometers [6–11,15,16,20,
22,24,26,28,29,33,35,36,39]. The specific model for temperature measuring devices was described in
three articles: Flir A40 or Flir P20 [10] and TVS-500EX, (NEC Avio Infrared Technologies Co., Ltd.,
Tokyo, Japan) [24,39]. Non-contact thermometers were used mainly in primary screening, and contact
or minimal contact thermometers in secondary screening.
Screening protocols for SARS in Canada, Taiwan, and Singapore used thermal scanning machines
as part of the primary screening, while as part of the secondary screening, Australia and Taiwan used
ear temperature thermometers and Canada used oral temperature thermometers [8,9,35].
Screening measures implemented in response to Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Australia,
Japan, Singapore and Taiwan were conducted using stationary infrared thermoscanners [20,24,26,33,36,39].
In Japan ear or axillary temperature measuring devices were also used [24]. Entry primary screening
temperature measurements in the US and exit primary screening temperature measurements in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone were conducted with handheld NCITs [6,22].
3.2.9. Appraisal of Impact of Entry and Exit Screening Measures Based on Case Identification
Entry screening measures for SARS did not identify any confirmed cases in the studies included
in this review; however, cases of SARS were notified in the countries where screening took place.
Entry and exit screening measures for EVD did not identify any confirmed cases. In the two (United
States, United Kingdom) out of the five countries that implemented entry screening (Australia, Japan,
United States, Belgium, United Kingdom), EVD disease cases were imported (one case in the UK
and nine in the US), but were asymptomatic during travel [27,34]. The detection rate of confirmed
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases among all passengers screened ranged from 2.2 to 0.01 per
10,000 travelers in China and Japan, respectively [24,40].
The numbers of travelers screened and identified as suspected and confirmed can be found in
Table 7 for entry screening and in Table 8 for exit screening. Tables 7 and 8 include surveillance data of
cases from countries that implemented entry/exit screening for the infectious diseases [15,41–47].
For SARS, six out of the 46 suspected cases identified through entry screening measures for SARS
were diagnosed with atypical pneumonia or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with secondary
infection or bronchopneumonia in Taiwan [35]. SARS was not confirmed in any suspected cases.
In Australia, four hospitalized persons were ultimately given an alternative or undetermined
diagnosis other than the initial targeted SARS [8].
For Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Among 391 travelers identified as suspect cases during
entry screening measures applied for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Japan, five were diagnosed
as influenza type A and one as type B [26]; while genotyping showed that among the five type A cases,
one was Russian flu (H1N1), one was Hong Kong flu (H3N2), and three were Influenza Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009.
Similarly, two other articles [24,39] described cases that were finally diagnosed with Influenza
type A or B, and not the Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 that screening targeted in Japan.
For EVD, during entry screening measures applied for EVD in Australia, six out of 123 screened
travelers from EVD-affected countries developed symptoms compatible with EVD, and when further
assessed, were diagnosed with influenza or upper respiratory tract infection [31]. Entry screening
measures applied for EVD in Japan identified nine individuals with compatible symptoms, who were
finally diagnosed with malaria (four travelers), influenza (four travelers) and other (one traveler) [38].
In an article describing entry screening procedures for Zika virus disease in Taiwan, five out of 21,083,404
inbound screened passengers were laboratory-confirmed cases of Zika virus disease; whereas 130 cases
of Dengue fever and four cases of Chikungunya infection were found [7].
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4638 22 of 53











Taiwan 3 March to 22 April2003 2819 46 0 - - 346/unknown [35]






For health alert notices inbound: 2478;
For thermal imaging scanner inbound: 95 0 - - 251/unknown [9]
Australia 5 April to 16 June2003 1.84 million arrivals
794 were referred for screening to quarantine and inspection service
staff. Of these, 734 (92.4%) were referred by quarantine/inspection
service staff to the nurses at airports. 19 (2.4%) were then referred to
the Chief Quarantine Officer
0 - - 6/unknown [8]
Singapore 31 March to 31 May2003 442,973 136 0 - - 238/unknown [23]
Singapore 9 April to 21 Sept 2003 No informationavailable
4044 travelers were detected to have temperatures >37.5 ◦C through
screening at the airport and sea terminals. Of these travelers, 327
were referred to hospital for assessment and 39 were admitted for
further evaluation and isolation.




Singapore 27 April to 27 June2009 - - 14 - - [36]
Australia 28 April to 18 June2009 625,147
5845 (0.93%) identified as symptomatic or febrile, 1296 (22.17%)



















805 15 - - [24]
Japan 1 September 2009 to31 January 2010 9,140,435 1049 10 - - [24]
Japan
Period I: 28 April to
21 May 2009, Period







Period II: 5 - - [39]











Taiwan From 27 April to 19June 2009 1,732,455
2685 were detected £ to have suspicious symptoms, including 1303
fever cases. Among these fever cases, 184 were sent to hospitals for
further diagnosis and treatment after they were evaluated in terms
of travel history and symptoms, by quarantine physicians or
quarantine officers.
12 [33]
China 16 May to 30September 2009 600,000 132 - - [40]
Peru 24 April to 4 July 2009 500,000 0 0 - - [32]
New
Zealand
27 April to 22 June
2009 456,518
406 (0.09%) of these were referred for medical assessment. Of those,








>1200 travelers were referred to CDC for additional screening
because of illness or, more commonly, to assess possible exposures;
28 persons were referred for medical evaluation.
0 - - - [28]
US 11 October to 10November 2014 1993 86 (4.3%) 0 - - - [6]
US 11 October 2014 to 31January 2015 7587
543 (7.2%) were referred to on-site CDC screening at the airport for
additional exposure risk assessment. At the time of assessment, 12
(0.16%) travelers were referred for medical evaluation at a local
hospital.
0 - - 11/9 [34]
Australia 1 October 2014 to 13April 2015 123 6 0 - - - [31]
Belgium 20 October 2014 to 17March 2015 13,356 0 0 - - - [27]
UK October 2014 toMarch 2015 Approximately 5000 9 0 - - 1/1 [27]
UK 14 October 2014 to 4January 2015
3388 passengers
screened at UK ports
of entry
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Taiwan 2013 to 2016 85,464,274 67,704 ill passengers detected by entry screening, 9944 specimenscollected 518 - - 61,118/1,249 [7]
Taiwan 2003 to 2007 - - 4119/539 [11]
Taiwan July 2003 to June 2004 8,000,000
≈22,000 passengers were identified as fever patients. After clinical
diagnosis, 3011 serum samples were sent for laboratory diagnosis of
Dengue virus infection.
40 - - 6005/73 [15]
Chikungunya
infection Taiwan 2013 to 2016 85,464,274
67,704 ill passengers detected by entry screening, 9944 specimens
collected 29 - - 91/48 [7]
* Visual and fever screening, medical and laboratory assessment and questionnaire were applied. † Visual screening, medical and laboratory assessment were applied. £ Visual and fever
screening, medical and laboratory assessment were applied. ** Data in this column were extracted from papers and websites other than those fulfilling the eligibility criteria, which are
listed in the last column of the table [15,41–48].
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Table 9. Reported facts about the cost of screening measure.
Disease Type of Screening and Setting Cost of Measures Recommendations Reference
Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome
General, ad hoc entry/exit screening at
airport in Canada
An estimated Can$ 7.55 million was invested in airport
screening measures from March 18 to July 5, 2003.
“Rather than investing in airport screening measures to detect rare
infectious diseases, investments should be used to strengthen





General, ad hoc entry screening at airport
in New South Wales (NSW), Australia
The cost of staffing airport clinics in NSW has been
estimated at about US$50,000 per case detected (NSW
Ministry of Health, unpublished data, 2012).
“Given the costs associated with staffing airport clinics, careful
consideration should be given to deploying resources to airports for
largely ineffective screening measures, compared with other activities
such as contact tracing in the community”.
[20]
Dengue fever General, entry screening at airport on
routine basis in Taiwan
Not addressed.
“Our evaluation of the routine border screening for Dengue using
NCITs yielded a low Positive Predictive Value, which suggested a low
cost-effectiveness”.
[10]
The airport fever screening method requires an infrared
thermal camera, which costs approximately US$ 43,000
for each set of instruments. In addition, one additional
worker is needed to monitor this alarm system.
“The cost of identifying Dengue virus infections with airport fever
screening is similar to that of other surveillance methods. The porting
procedure and clinical and laboratory diagnoses are similar to those of
surveillance methods. Therefore, the method is a cost-effective means
of identifying imported Dengue cases”.
[15]
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None of the 27 articles fulfilling the eligibility criteria systematically conducted a cost-effectiveness
analysis for entry or exit screening measures. Five articles addressed issues for the cost of screening
measures (Table 9) [9,10,15,20,23].
3.2.10. Management of Suspected Cases
Table 6 summarizes the case management where available. Concerning the applied protocol after
diagnosis and management of cases of Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, two articles described how
patients positive for H1N1 were hospitalized/isolated, and close contacts or persons seated within
2 m around the index patient during the flight were quarantined [26,39]. One article described that
persons tested positive to H1N1 with RT-PCR were offered oseltamivir, and were sent home or to a
facility for isolation [21]. The ECDC report describes the management of treating EVD patients in
designated hospitals, including isolation, personal protective equipment, samples, waste management
and post-mortem procedures [27].
In respect to health measures applied to the travelers during the exit screening for EVD, the ECDC
technical report refers that 77 out of 36,000 screened travelers were identified and denied boarding,
although none were later diagnosed with EVD [22].
Another ECDC report concerning entry screening for EVD, describes that in the UK persons in
the low and higher risk exposure categories were monitored for 21 days after leaving the country of
interest by public health emergency services [27].
The Health Canada’s protocols for airplane passenger contact tracing had evolved during the
SARS outbreak and were updated during the Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 [9]. At the beginning,
contact tracing of passengers included follow-up of passengers seated in the same row, two rows in
front, and two rows behind someone with a probable case, who was symptomatic while in flight. Later,
contact tracing was expanded to include persons who were contacts to suspected cases while in flight.
In Japan, local authorities received contact information about overseas travelers from the competent
authority at the airport and monitored their health daily by phone. Later on, the observation by local
authorities was performed for seven days only for those seated within two meters from a patient [26].
During the implementation of entry screening measures for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in
Japan, patients positive for H1N1 were isolated, and close contacts were quarantined [39]. At first,
health monitoring by health centers was performed for passengers arriving from affected countries,
and later for only those who had come into contact with the individuals identified by entry screening.
Enhanced surveillance included mandatory reporting of details of the infected individuals. An entry
card was given to all arriving passengers instructing them to consult with staff at public health centers
in the event of developing symptoms while in Japan.
In another article [40] general practitioners at the community hospitals performed medical
follow-up on the foreign travelers, who were contacted daily for 7 days after entry into Beijing by the
general practitioners by telephone or face-to-face interview, in order to report on their health status.
When a traveler reported having influenza-like illness symptoms, she/he was asked to attend the
jurisdictional hospital for testing.
3.2.11. Limitations of Screening Measures and Challenges Reported
Regarding challenges, 11 out of 26 articles refer to limitations, failures, and mishaps of applied
screening measures.
Samaan et al. noted that the applied screening measures may still have been ineffective due to
false declarations by travelers, denying contact with people with SARS, or taking antipyretic drugs to
conceal fever [8]. Lee et al. mentioned that travelers tried to conceal symptoms so as to be treated in
Taiwan where medical fees were lower than in Hong Kong during the SARS outbreak (Figure 2) [35].
St John et al. highlighted that screening measures (health alert questionnaires and thermal scanning
machines) were non-specific for SARS [9].
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Regarding screening measures for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (Figure 3), Gunaratnam et al.
referred to the underestimation in the number of cases acquired overseas [20]. Fujita et al. noted that
during the incubation period, when patients have no symptoms or high fever, it is almost impossible to
identify patients by quarantine officers, coupled with the quick inspection kit having only about 70%
accuracy [26]. Similarly, Hale et al. attributed ineffectiveness (estimated sensitivity 5.8%) of screening
measures to the high proportion of asymptomatic infected travelers, incubation of infections acquired
before or during a flight, reliance on self-identification, limitations of case definitions, and limitations
of thermal scanning [21].
The authors of the 27 articles fulfilling the eligibility criteria of the current review attempted
to assess the impact of screening measures or commented on the impact, as presented in Table 10.
Assessment of public health impact.
In Appendix F, WHO statements (concerning screening and travel restrictions in relation to public
health events) that were used in the current report are presented.
The screening methods protocol design and the robustness of application can influence the
effectiveness of screening measures [50]. The exposure and symptom assessment methods, the tools
and type of equipment used, and the number of staff involved and their training play an important role
in the outcome of screening measures [50]. Screening protocols for symptoms and exposure assessment
included questionnaires, health alert leaflets, visual checks, and body temperature measurements.
Each method has its strengths and limitations [22]. In the reviewed evidence, self-reporting of exposure
and symptoms in questionnaires relies on the honesty of the responder, language barriers exist, and
fever symptoms can be concealed by antipyretic drug use [8]. Screening cannot detect incubating or
asymptomatic travelers [24]. Fever and other symptoms are non-specific and planning and resources
are needed for possible high demand of laboratory tests [22]. During the EVD epidemic in West Africa in
2014/2015, (Figure 4) some travelers attempted to escape entry screening by presenting passports which
did not show that they had traveled to an affected country [51]. In general, the prevalence of disease
targeted by screening is very low among travelers, and the positive predictive values and the sensitivity
of screening measures are expected to be very low for the diseases targeted through screening [9].
This is expected especially when general massive (to all travelers) rather than targeted screening
measures (e.g., to travelers coming from affected countries or certain direct flights) are applied.
Data from the systematic bibliographic review were used to develop the algorithm for making
evidence-based decisions in implementing entry and exit screening measures (Appendix E).
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Table 10. Assessment of public health impact as reported by authors.
Disease/Type of Screening/ Point of
Entry/Country Methods Results References
Dengue fever/ Entry screening on routine basis/
Airport/Taiwan
Comparing confirmed cases identified at points of
entry with total imported cases
“Airport fever screening was successful in identifying 45% (244/542; 95%
confidence interval 33.1–57.8%) of imported Dengue cases with fever.” [11]
Dengue fever/ Entry screening on routine basis/
Airport/Taiwan
Fluctuations in the number of symptomatic
imported Dengue cases identified in the airports
(X) were associated with the total number of
imported Dengue cases (Y) based on a regression
analysis of a biweekly surveillance
“By implementing the airport fever screening program followed by laboratory
confirmation, nearly half of the imported symptomatic Dengue cases were
detected at entry.”
“An analysis of the dataset according to the geographical areas (25
counties/cities) indicated that there were significant correlations between the
annual cumulative number of Dengue importations identified at the airports (X)
and the number of Dengue importations reported from community clinics (Y) (n
= 96, Y = 0.93X + 1.208, R2 = 0.57, p < 0.0001).”
[10]
Dengue fever/ Entry screening on routine basis/
Airport/Taiwan
Comparing confirmed cases identified at points of
entry with total imported cases
“518/1188 confirmed cases identified at points of entry/total imported cases
(43.6%)” [7]
Dengue fever/ Entry screening on routine basis/
Airport/Taiwan
Comparing confirmed cases identified at points of
entry with total imported cases. Comparing
numbers of imported cases before and after
screening measure implementation
“Airport fever screening alone identified 40 (83.3%) of 48 of all imported cases
identified by the active surveillance system.”
“Fever screening at the airports has also dramatically increased the proportion of
imported Dengue cases identified by active surveillance, 48 (65.8%), of 73
which is significantly higher than the number identified during years before
fever screening were implemented (p < 0.0001 by chi-square test)”
[15]
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009/ Entry screening
ad hoc/ Airport/Japan
Comparing cases in the community and imported
cases identified through screening
“In spite of the quarantine inspection, the number of Japanese patients with
novel influenza reached 633 by June 18, 2009. Only 11 patients were found by
the airport quarantine inspection, but importantly, about 20% of all patients had
an overseas travel history and had passed through the quarantine inspection.”
[26]
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009/ Entry screening
ad hoc/ Airport/Japan
Comparing surveillance data of imported cases
with entry screening results and investigating
imported cases’ travel history and time of
symptoms onset
“6.6% (10/151) of the individuals infected during international travel were
identified by the border control measures upon entry in May and June 2009.”
“2 individuals among those identified later in Japan to be infected had been
missed at entry despite being symptomatic. 22 others were identified after entry
into Japan despite being symptomatic at entry screening.”
“Health monitoring identified 8 infected individuals. Enhanced surveillance
identified 812 individuals, 141 (18%) of whom had a history of international
travel. 24 these 141 passengers picked up by enhanced surveillance had been
developing symptoms on entry and were missed at screening.”
[39]
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009/ Entry screening
ad hoc/ Airport/Taiwan
Comparing surveillance data of imported cases
with entry screening results
“Cases identified among passengers screened out by quarantine measures and
transferred to hospitals by quarantine officers account for 20.3% (12 cases) of all
imported cases.”
[33]
Zika virus disease/ Entry screening ad hoc/
Airport/ Taiwan
Comparing confirmed cases identified at points of
entry with total imported cases
“As of October 31, 2016, Taiwan has no locally acquired Zika infections, but 13
imported cases have been identified, of which 38% were identified by airport
border screening.”
[7]
Chikungunya infection / Entry screening ad hoc/
Airport/ Taiwan
Comparing confirmed cases identified at points of
entry with total imported cases
“29/48 Confirmed cases identified at points of entry/total imported cases
(60.4%)” [7]
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4. Discussion
4.1. Impact of Exit Screening Measures at Airports, Ports, and Ground Crossings
Evidence from this review about prevention of international transmission of disease by detecting
and prohibiting travel to exposed or ill travelers from affected countries is mainly based on the
measures implemented in response to EVD in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Senegal,
and Mali [6,16,28,49]. In total, about 300,000 were screened in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, but no
case was detected through exit screening measures. During the study reporting period, four confirmed
cases were exported through air travel during the exit screening measure implementation, but were not
symptomatic while traveling [16]. EVD is a disease with high pathogenicity and a very low number of
asymptomatic cases [52]. Consequently, it is probably unlikely that additional cases would have been
exported through air or sea travel without being detected by surveillance systems in the destination
non-affected countries.
An assessment of the impact of exit screening measures at ground crossings is much more
challenging than at airports and seaports. The 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak spread through the population
movement in the land borders of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and was later introduced to Senegal
and Mali [16]. As reported by Cohen et al., the implementation of land-border screening measures
was challenging given the high mobility of populations through formal and informal points [16].
It was not possible to apply at ground crossings the same protocols that were applied at airports
and seaports. Exit screening at ground crossings combined visual checks for symptomatic persons at
official ground crossings, health education, and community engagement, as well as implementation
of plans for isolation, communication, assessment, referral, and transportation. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no published evidence meeting the inclusion/search criteria about the positive
impact of screening measures at ground crossings in preventing the exportation of EVD cases from
affected countries.
Exit screening measures may have helped to prevent extensive travel and trade restrictions,
by providing confidence to the different stakeholders that measures are in place to protect the public
from exportation of cases. As stated by Rhymer and Speare, travel and trade restrictions disregarding
WHO recommendations were implemented worldwide in 58 (31.0%) of 187 WHO State Parties [53].
Exit screening measures may have balanced the overreactions. Exit screening measures enabled business
continuity to trade and transport sectors, as well as the continuation of public health organizations
and humanitarian missions to support the affected countries [16,27,28]. Another secondary effect of
screening measures is that thorough exit screening measures at borders may have played a role in
discouraging ill or exposed persons from attempting to leave the affected countries [25].
It is unknown how many cases would have been exported if exit screening measures at the
points of entry of the affected countries would not have been implemented. Even if no case was
detected through exit screening measures, concomitant benefits from exit screening measures may be
of paramount importance and should also be considered when assessing impact and making decisions
for health measures. Considering that all countries should be prepared to deal with unexpected
events as laid down in the IHR 2005, and lessons learnt are available from past events for which
temporary recommendations for exit screening measures were issued by WHO, all countries should
have the capacities to implement exit screening measures at points of entry (designated airports, ports,
and ground crossings), and this should be part of the preparedness planning [3,5].
4.2. Impact of Entry Screening Measures
Since the IHR 2005 entered into force in 2007, temporary recommendations for exit screening
measures have been issued by WHO as part of a set of measures to be implemented in areas affected
from outbreaks [5]. On the contrary, entry screening was recommended only for specific settings
and timeframes by WHO, and only in response to the Ebola outbreak in DRC in 2018 [5]. Moreover,
advice was given that if entry screening measures are implemented, countries should consider that
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“entry screening may have a limited effect in reducing international spread when added to exit screening, and its
advantages and disadvantages should be carefully considered . . . if entry screening is implemented, States
should take into account the following considerations: it offers an opportunity for individual sensitization,
but the resource demands may be significant, even if screening is targeted; and management systems must be
in place to care for travelers and suspected cases in compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR)
requirements” [5].
The primary objective of entry screening measures is to prevent or to delay introduction of ill or
incubating cases to a country. Evidence for achieving this primary objective is based on the measures
implemented in response to the EVD epidemic in West Africa in 2014/2015, SARS, Influenza Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 and Zika virus disease, as well as entry screening measures implemented on a routine basis
for Dengue fever and Chikungunya infection. None of the countries that implemented entry screening
for SARS detected any case [8,9,23,29,35]. For Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 the detection rate
ranged from 0.01 to 2.2 confirmed cases per 10,000 persons screened [20,21,24,26,32,33,39,40]. A survey
conducted by WHO showed an aggregate rate of 4 confirmed cases per 1,000,000 screened travelers for
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in 10 countries [50]. For EVD, no case was identified through entry
screening measures [6,27,28,31,34,37,38]. For Zika virus disease, five cases were identified and more
than 21,000,000 persons screened [7]. Routine entry screening measures for Dengue fever showed
a detection rate of less than 8%. It should be noted that the diseases targeted by entry screenings
such as SARS, EVD and the Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 have a very low prevalence among
travelers, therefore the positive predictive value of entry screening is expected to be close to zero [9].
Cowling and colleagues compared the dates of the first reported case of Influenza Pandemic (H1N1)
2009 in countries which implemented entry screening measures with countries that did not implement
such measures. They concluded that entry screening may delay the introduction of a new influenza
strain for about 7–12 days [54]. However, it should be noted that it was not possible for the study to
assess which measures other than entry screening implemented by the countries have contributed to
delaying introduction.
Several attempts were made by researchers to evaluate the public health impact of entry screening
measures by comparing numbers of cases identified through screenings at airports with the total
number of imported cases, or with cases locally acquired in the country in the same timeframe.
However, the onset of symptoms was not assessed in all cases and it is not clear if the imported cases
passed through screening were symptomatic or incubating. Entry screening at airports implemented
on routine basis proved to be successful in Taiwan (an island) in identifying about half of the imported
cases of Dengue fever [7,10]. Twelve out of 59 imported cases of Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
were detected through entry screening within 54 days of entry screening [33]. In Japan, 6.6% (10/151)
of Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases were identified by airport entry screening [39]. Another
study in Japan showed that only 11 confirmed cases of Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 were detected
through entry screening, but 633 cases were diagnosed among the Japanese population and about
20% of them had passed through the entry screening [26]. The detection rate of Dengue fever and
Chikungunya infection was higher than that of influenza. This can be attributed to the difference in
the severity of symptoms and whether it can be observable or measurable when passing the entry
points at airports, as well as the rate of persons who will ask for medical care in the health care system
and will be captured by the routine surveillance system. Moreover, this can be attribute to the fact that
entry screening for vector-borne diseases in Taiwan has been implemented on a routine basis for long
periods of time and not as part of response measures to emergencies that are implemented in short
periods of time.
According to the results of this review, evidence suggested that the primary objective of entry
screening implemented in response to public health emergencies—which is to detect imported cases at
borders—was not achieved, but several beneficial concomitant effects have been reported in several
instances, including educating travelers passing through the screening points, providing contacts of
public health authorities to travelers in case they develop symptoms, collecting contact details for
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contact tracing, maintaining confidence that air travel is safe, preserving public confidence, and helping
to avoid major economic, social and international impacts which even a single imported severe disease
can cause [6,23,25]. Entry screening alone seems to be ineffective in preventing or delaying introduction
of diseases to a country; however, it could be justified for severe diseases, as part of a set of measures
complementing each other, after setting priorities and where there are available resources [26]. The
ECDC suggests that entry screening at airports in combination with exit screening could be of value, if
exit screening measures are questionable and if the timeframe between departure and arrival at the
destination country is long [22].
The research strategy of this bibliographic review did not reveal statistical data specifically for
entry screening at ground crossings. Crossing land borders for sick, symptomatic persons may be easier
than moving through air or sea means of transport. The density of populations crossing land borders
can be very intense or not at all from place to place. The EVD epidemic in West Africa in 2014/2015
spread between the affected countries in West Africa through land borders [16]. This fact should be
considered by policy makers for preparedness planning. Countries where many official and unofficial
crossing points exist or countries where border checks are not routinely conducted at ground crossings
may not be well prepared to respond. Preparedness activities for potential unexpected events should
include plans for implementation of screening measures at ground crossings. Screening measures at
land borders require cooperation among neighboring countries and regions. However, considering the
previously reported challenges and the lack of evidence on the impact of entry screening measures
at ground crossings, this area may represent a gap in preparedness in the event of a high risk of
exportation/introduction and spread of disease through land borders of neighboring countries.
4.3. Cost-Effectiveness of Screening Measures
Very limited information is available about the cost and cost-effectiveness of screening measures.
General entry screening measures at airports of Australia for Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009,
Canada for SARS, and Taiwan for Dengue fever cost about US$50,000 per case detected (airport clinic
staffing cost), a total of 7.55 million Can$ investment for a period of four months, and US$ 43,000 for
each set of instruments used at screening, respectively [10]. Investing in screening measures reduces
the resources from other possibly more effective measures [9,23]. Further cost-effectiveness studies
could be conducted to analyze the cost and benefits of screening measures, and to compare these with
other public health measures to inform decision-makers.
4.4. Decision-Making
Although the inability of entry screening measures to identify cases of SARS in the 2003 outbreak
was known during the public health emergencies that occurred the following years, decision-making
during the Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and the EVD epidemic in West Africa in 2014/2015 seemed
to be based on other reasons. Several authors suggest that screening measures in several cases may
have been implemented mainly to relieve political and social pressure, and limit negative economic
consequences from travel and trade restrictions [8], as well as to preserve public confidence [8,9,29]
and maintain confidence that air travel is safe [6].
When temporary recommendations from WHO for screening measures have been issued in
response to a public health event, then countries should have the capacities to implement such
measures. Other factors of consideration are: the disease severity, the transmissibility (and whether
the transmission takes place before or after symptom onset), the mode of transmission, the incubation
period, the symptomatology of disease, and how easily the disease can be detected, the proportion of
febrile patients, the temporal and spatial extent and the phase of the outbreak, any available results
from modeling studies, the type of country, and point of entry, the disease epidemiology in the
country, the volume of travelers and connections to affected areas (Appendix E). All these factors
should be considered to estimate the possible expected detection rates, and to balance this with other
measures that could be implemented, and the cost and effectiveness of those. A mathematical model
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presented by Gostic, K.M., and colleagues, demonstrated how different factors of six disease and
outbreak characteristics and human behavior can affect screening measures’ effectiveness. It showed
that “for pathogens with longer incubation periods, exposure risk detection dominates in growing
epidemics, while fever becomes a better target in stable or declining epidemics. For pathogens with
short incubation, fever screening drives detection in any epidemic stage. However, even in the most
optimistic scenario arrival screening will miss the majority of cases” [18].
4.5. Modeling
The scoping search identified several studies reporting results of modeling that can inform
decision-makers about the potential effects of entry screening measure implementation. A study
modeled the number of expected Ebola infected travelers exiting affected countries, the potential effect
of air travel restrictions, and the efficiency of airport-based traveler screening at international points of
entry and exit [55]. The study concluded that exit screening measures at three airports in the affected
countries would be successful in assessing all potentially exposed or Ebola-affected travelers. Another
study created a model to assess the effectiveness of entry screening for the 2009 Influenza Pandemic
(H1N1) in the US and concluded that it will not significantly delay arrival of influenza cases by air
travel, but will reduce the rate of new US cases and subsequent deaths [56].
4.6. Resources and Logistics
If entry or exit screening measures are decided to be implemented, detailed planning is required,
with careful execution to ensure consistent application by all staff involved and to all targeted travelers.
The timing (starting and stopping of screening measures), the screening methods, the technology and
tools, the human resources and training issues should be considered in the preparedness and response
plans. Training of staff is an important component and should address recognizing the signs and
symptoms of the disease, screening procedures and documentation, and appropriate use of personal
protective equipment and technology for measuring body temperature [6].
Interview space must be available at the facilities of the point of entry as required by the IHR
2005 [3]. The WHO suggests that preparedness plans’ functionality should be periodically tested with
simulation exercises [57]. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for entry or exit screening measures
could be tested in practice with simulation exercises. Documented, regularly updated and tested
national guidelines and SOPs for health measures at points of entry, including entry and exit screening,
are checked in the framework of the joint external evaluation of core capacities [58]. Capacities for
entry and exit screening should be part of the national planning.
The most suitable site of primary and secondary screening should be decided: on board the
conveyance, at the terminal, or before or after checking in or collecting luggage. Gaber and colleagues
suggest that exit screening at airports should take place before travelers deliver luggage at the terminal,
to avoid the checking-in of suitcases from infected travelers that later may need to be traced and
removed [59].
Further essential resources include capacities for laboratory diagnosis, quarantine, isolation,
and treatment of suspected exposed or affected travelers. In the US, during the EVD epidemic in West
Africa in 2014/2015 customs and border protection officers conducted the primary entry screening at
airports and public health officers conducted the secondary screening [6]. As suggested previously,
entry screening should be part of a broader set of measures and different stakeholders need to cooperate.
Both the public and the private sectors, the transport industry, points of entry administrations and
actors at all levels, from the local point of entry to the national, EU and international level should be
involved [7]. Guidance and advice entry and exit screening measures from international organizations
may further support decision-making.
Other issues for consideration about entry screening are the identification of targeted travelers or
itineraries at ports, airports, and ground crossings, including lists of returning workers from missions
in affected countries (if applicable, obtained from aid recruiting organizations), lists of visas granted to
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affected countries, disclosure policies, and expert support on legal, communication, health advisory
and others issues [31,38].
This bibliographic review showed that most of the entry primary fever screening for SARS,
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and vector-borne diseases was conducted using thermal scanner
cameras, followed when necessary by secondary screening using NCITs or contact thermometers.
An ECDC technical report reviewed evidence about the accuracy of body temperature measuring
devices and concluded that there are a variety of technologies available commercially; some NCITs
are approved for use as diagnostic tools as happens with the contact thermometers, but thermal
scanner cameras have not been evaluated for such purpose [22]. The report continues that NCITs are
more accurate than the thermal scanner cameras. The US CDC evaluated the performance of NCITs,
showing a sensitivity of 80–99% and a specificity of 75–99%. Equipment calibration and accuracy
checks according to manufacturers’ instructions, and training of staff in the correct use are essential
during screening measure implementation.
4.7. Limitations of the Bibliographic Review
Research questions of the bibliographic review were answered based on published information;
much more unpublished evidence may exist that could not be considered. Many other countries had
implemented entry screening measures in response to the 2009 Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) on the
European region, but very few of them published screening results and experience [50]. Databases
searched index health-related publications; it is possible that additional publications exist related to
cost-effectiveness of screening measures. Language bias could be one limitation of the review, since only
articles in English, Dutch, German, and Greek were included in the review. In total, four articles
were excluded due to language. Moreover, bias could occur from the fact that most of the published
literature is about entry screening measures, rather than exit screening.
Screening measures to migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers were not under the scope of
this review. In case of forced migration travelers often cross borders through unofficial points (land
crossings or arriving by boats at coastlines) and not the official points of entry where authorities and
structures exists. In this case, the authorities that are involved in screening and the procedures are
different from what is applied at the official points of entry for regular travelers. Moreover, if migrants
arrive in a country at the official points of entry, each country implements its own policy in terms
of targeted diseases and examinations. This review did not analyze data from screening measures
to migrants.
5. Conclusions
For preparedness purposes and to be ready to respond to any unexpected public health event,
all countries should have the capacities to implement entry and exit screening at designated ports,
airports, and ground crossings. Exit screening measures could be prioritized compared to entry
measures, based on past temporary recommendations issued during PHEIC. Evidence from this
review suggests that entry screening measures alone are not effective in detecting imported cases
at borders, but may allow opportunities for raising awareness and educating the traveling public.
The current review further suggests that there are difficulties in assessing the impact of border screening
measures. Statistical data demonstrate very low detection rates of cases in both entry and exit screening.
The decision about the implementation of screening measures should be examined on a case-by-case
basis, after considering the disease and outbreak characteristics, the country situation, and the available
resources, which can be compared to the cost and effectiveness of other alternative measures. Screening
measures have important concomitant effects when implemented in combination with health education
and informative strategies for travelers, the decision-making process should take those effects into
consideration. Specificities at each type of point of entry (port, airport, ground crossing) should
be considered for the implementation of screening measures, since different approaches are needed
for each type of point of entry. The implementation of entry and exit screening measures require
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planning, allocation of resources, and careful design and application of protocols. Decision-makers
should be aware and consider the limitations of screening methods, including false declarations by
passengers about exposure and disease signs and symptoms, use of antipyretic drugs to conceal fever by
travelers, inability to detect incubating or asymptomatic travelers, language barriers, and false positive
and false negative results expected from temperature measuring devices. Based on review results,
an algorithm about decision-making for entry/exit screening was developed. Guidance and advice on
decision-making related to entry and exit screening measures from international organizations would
be helpful to countries when developing their preparedness plans, as well as when deciding about
response measures to public health events. Training of staff are among the key issues for implementing
a robust screening program at points of entry.
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Appendix B Questionnaire for Checking on Eligibility Criteria
Title of article: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Author: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Year of publication: . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Type of screening (entry, exit) Yes
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Appendix 2: Quest onnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: …………………………………… …………… ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, xit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infect ous disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of p ints of ent y (airports, po ts, ground crossings) where measures were 
impl mented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out n a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health ev nt has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods us d in ntry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temp rature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology us d (thermometers, scan cameras, o  other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis rotoc l (labor tory a d clinical examinatio ) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
i. Total numbe s of t avel rs screened for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
j. Percentag  of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with th  target d dis ase 
Yes  No  
k. Percentag  of persons diagnosed with differe t disease from the ini ially targeted fo  the 
specific ti frame (positive and n gative predictiv  values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or target d screening (e.g., t aveler from any affected outbound country, 
all t avelers directly arriving only from affected countrie /areas, nationality of t avelers, t avelers i -
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the ntry/exit screening 
measures or the cos -effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Quest onnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry exit  
b. Types of infect ous disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting  
c. Ty e of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out n a routine basis  or on an ad hoc b sis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in ntry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temp rature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology us d: thermometers scan cameras  
. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has
occurred and its purpose Yes
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of scr eni g (entry, exit)   No  
b. Types of infectiou  disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry ( irp rts, ports, gro nd crossings) where measures were 
impl m nted Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or  an ad hoc basis ft r a public health event has 
oc urr d and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description f m thods used in ent y/exit screenin  (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, techn gy used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (th rmometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After creeni g, th  p lied di gnosis prot col (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases iden ified for  specific t meframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons po itiv  to screening that were di gnosed wit  the targeted disease 
Ye   No  
k. P rcen age of persons diagnosed with different disease fro  the initially targeted for the 
specif c timefr me (positive and egative predictive valu s) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all trav ler  directly arriving only from ffe ted countries/ar as, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affect country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting n the ass ssment f the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-eff ctiveness of meth ds ap lied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screenin : entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit scre ing was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening ca ri d out on a routine b sis  or on an ad h c basis  after a public health event 
ha  occ rred 
e. M thods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
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Appendix 2: Quest onnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: …………………………………… …………… ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, xit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infect ou  disease or di eases that e try and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of p ints of ent y ( irports, po ts, ground cro sings) where measures were 
impl mented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out n a routine basis o an ad hoc basis ft r a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods us d in nt y/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temp rature che k, techno og used) Yes  No  
f. Ty e of technology used (th rmometers, scan cameras, o  other technology) 
g. After screening, th  applied di gnosis prot c l (labor tory a d clinical examination) 
h. Numb r of cases iden if ed f r  specific t frame Yes  No  
i. Total numbe s of t avel rs screened for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
j. Percentag  of persons po itiv  to screening that were diagnosed with th  target d disease 
Yes  No  
k. P rce tag  of persons diagnosed wi h different isease fro  the ini ially targeted for the 
specific ti fr me (pos tive and gative predicti  valu s) Yes  No  
l. Gen ral scr ening or target d screening (e.g., t aveler from any affected outbound country, 
all t avelers dir ctly arriving only from affe ted countrie /ar as, ationality of t avelers, t avelers in-
transit that have call  an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting n the assessment f the public health impact of the ntry/exit screening 
measures or the c s -effectiveness of meth ds ap lied 
Appendix 3: Quest onnaire for data extraction  
a. Ty e of screeni : entry exit  
b. Type  of infect ous isease or diseas s that e try nd xit scre ing was targeting  
c. Ty e of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out n a routine b sis  or on an ad hoc b sis  after a public health event 
ha  occurred 
e. M thods used in ntry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temp rature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology us d: thermometers scan cameras  
e. Descriptio of methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, body
temperature check, technology used) Yes
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Appendix 2: Questi naire for checking n eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of s reening (entry, exit    No  
b. Types of infectious disease r disease  that entry and exit scr ening was targ ting Yes  No 
 
. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) w re measures were 
implemented     
d. Screening carrie  o t o  a routine basi  or o  an d hoc basis after a public health event has 
occ rred and its purpose Y s  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit screening (p imary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body t mpera ure check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of t chnology used (ther ometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After scre ning, the appli d iagno is protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identifi d for a specific timef am  Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentag  of persons positive to scr ening that we  diagnosed with th  targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Per entage of pe sons d a nosed with differ nt dise se from he i itially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative predict ve v lues) Yes  No  
l. Ge eral scr e ing or t rg ted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all travelers directly arrivi g nly fr m affec d ountries/areas, nationality of trav lers, travelers in-
t ansit at hav  called an ffected c un ry/ar as (West Africa)) Y No   
m. R po t ng on the assessment of the public h alt  impact of th  entry/exit cr ening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Ty e of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infecti s disea e or di eases that entry and exit scre ning was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Scree ing carried out o  a outi e basis  or on an ad hoc ba is  after a public health event 
h s occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/ xit sc eeni g: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
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Appendix 2: Quest nnaire f r checking n eligibility criteria 
Title of article: …………………………………… …………… ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, xit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infect ou  disease or diseases that e try and exit scr ening as targ ting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of p i ts of ent y (airports, po ts, ground rossings) where measures were 
im l mented     
d. Screening carried out  a routi e basis or on an d hoc basis after a public health event has 
occ rred and its purpose     
e. Description of thod  us d in ntry/exit scr ening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body t mp ra ur  check, technol gy used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology us d (ther om ters, scan cameras, o  other technology) 
g. After scre ning, the applied diagnosis protoc l (labor tory a d clinical examination) 
h. Number of case  ident fi d for a specific ti fram Yes  No  
i. Total numbe s of t avel rs screened for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
j. Percentag  of persons positive to scr ening that wer  diagnosed with th  target d disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentag  of p rsons d a nosed with different disease fr m he i i ially targeted for the 
specific ti frame (positive and n gative predictiv  v lues) Yes  No  
l. G eral scr ening or t rget d screening (e.g., t aveler from any affected outbound country, 
all t avel rs directly arrivi g nly from affec d countrie /ar as, n tionality of t av lers, t avelers in-
transit that have called an ffected coun ry/areas (West Africa)) Y s  No   
m. R po t ng on the asses ment of the public h alth impact of the ntry/exit screening 
measures or the cos -effectiveness of metho s applied 
Appendix 3: Quest onnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry exit  
b. Types of infect s disea e or diseases th t e try and exit s re ning was targeting  
c. Ty e of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
. Scree ing carri d out  a routine basis  or on an ad hoc b is  after a public health event 
as ccurred 
e. Methods used in entry/ xit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temp rature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology us d: thermometers scan cameras  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology)
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination)
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes
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Ap endix 2: Que tionnaire for c cking on li ibility riteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publi ati n: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, exit)   No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative pr dictive values) Y s  No  
l. General screening or targeted scre ning (e.g., traveler from any affected utbound cou try, 
all r v lers d rectly arriving only from affected countries/areas, nation lity of travelers, tr velers in-
t a sit that have called an affected co ntry/a eas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on h ssessm nt of the publ c health impact of the e try/exit screeni g 
measur s or the c s -effectiv ness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
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Appendix 2: Que t onnaire for ch cki g on li ibility criteria 
Title of article: …………………………………… …………… ..………………………… 
A thor: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of s reening (entry, xit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infect ous disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of p ints of ent y (airports, po ts, ground crossings) where measures were 
impl mented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out n a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods us d in ntry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temp rature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology us d (thermometers, scan cameras, o  other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protoc l (labor tory a d clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
i. Total numbe s of t avel rs screened for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
j. Percentag  of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with th  target d disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentag  of persons diagnosed with diff rent disease from the ini ially targeted for the 
specific ti frame (positive and n gative pr dictiv  values) Y s  No  
l. General screening or target d scre ning (e.g., t aveler from any affected outb und cou try, 
all t avelers d rectly arrivin  only from affected countrie /areas, nationality of t avelers, t velers in-
transit hat have called an affe ted co ntry/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting o  h  ass ssm nt of the public health impact of the ntry/exit screeni g 
measur or the cos -effectivene s of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Quest onnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry exit  
b. Types of infect ous disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting  
c. Ty e of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out n a routine basis  or on an ad hoc b sis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in ntry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temp rature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology us d: thermometers scan cameras  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes
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Appe dix 2: Questionnaire for checking on ligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………… ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, exit)   No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implement d Yes  No 
. Screening carri d out n a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occur ed and i s purp se Yes  No 
e. Des ription f meth ds  in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body tem rature check, technol gy used) Ye   No  
f. Type of technology used (therm meters, scan cameras, or other technology  
g. A ter screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (lab ratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cas s id ntifi    i i  i      
i. Total numbers f traveler  scree ed for a sp cific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of p rsons diagnosed with differ nt di ease from the initially targeted for the 
sp cific tim frame (positive and n gativ  predicti v lu s) Yes  No  
l. Ge eral sc eening or ta ge  s r ening (e.g., traveler from an  aff cted outbound cou try, 
all tr elers directly rriving only from affected countries/ reas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit h t have called an ff c e  cou t y/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Repo ting o the asses ent of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
easur  or the cost-effec ive ess of meth appl ed 
Append x 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Type i fectious disease diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of p ints f entry: airports  p rts  ground cr ssings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
tem ratur   t l    else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
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Appendix 2: Quest onnaire for checking on ligibility criteria 
Title of article: ………………… …… ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of s r ening (entry, xit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infect ous disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of p ints of ent y (airports, po ts, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  N  
d. Scr ening carried out n a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occur ed and its purp se Yes  No  
e. Des ripti n f methods us d in ntry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temp rat r  check, technol gy used) Yes  No  
f. Typ  of technolo y us d (therm mete s, scan cameras, o  other tech ology  
g. A ter scre ning, the applied diagnosis protoc l (lab r tory a d clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identifi    i i  i     
i. Total numbe s f t avel r  scree ed for a sp cific ti frame Yes  No  
j. Percentag  of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with th  target d disease 
Yes  No  
k. Perce tag  of p rsons diagnosed with different disease from the ini ially targeted for the 
sp cific ti frame (positive and n gative predicti  values) Yes  No  
l. Ge eral screening or targe  screening (e.g., t aveler from any aff cted outbound country, 
all t elers directly arriving only from affected countrie /areas, nationality of t avelers, t avelers in-
tra it h t have c lled an af c d cou try/ar as (West Africa)) Y s  No   
m. Rep rting  the a sessm nt of the public health impact of the ntry/exit screening 
measur  or the c -effe iveness of method  appl ed 
Appendix 3: Quest onnaire fo  data extractio   
a. Type of scr ening: entry exit  
b. Type i fect ous disease  diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting  
c. Ty e of p ints of entry: airports  p rts  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out n a routine basis  or on an ad hoc b sis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods u d in ntry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
tem rature  technology us d  el e  
f. Type of technology us d: thermometers scan cameras  
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 4638 38 of 53
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease Yes
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, x 48 of 65 
 
Canada http://www.ciphi.ca 
Nigeria https://ncdc.gov.ng  
Liberia http://moh.gov.lr/, http://liberiamohsw.org/Policies&Plan.html 
Sierra Leone http://health.gov.sl, http://gov.sl/ministry-health-and-sanitation  
Mali http://www.sante.gov.ml/ 
ICAO https://www.icao.int  
IATA  https://www.iata.org  
CAPSCA https://www.capsca.org  
ACI https://aci.aero/  
CLIA https://cruising.org  
ISF http://www.allaboutshipping.co.uk  
UIC https://uic.org  
OTIF https://otif.org  
OSJD http://en.osjd.org 
CIT https://www.cit-rail.org  
ERRAC http://errac.org  
Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of scre nin  (entry, xit)   No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affected countries/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
No
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures w re 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affected countries/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnair   body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the initially targeted for the specific
timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Yes
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of ar cle: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Typ  of screening (entry, exit    No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routi e basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit scr ening (primary/secondary, questi nn ire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. A ter scre ning, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases iden ified for a pecific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific tim frame Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive t  screening that were diagnosed with the targ ted di eas  
Yes  No  
k. Pe centage o  persons diagnosed with diff rent disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negati  predictive values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbo nd country, 
all travelers directly arriving only fro  aff cted countries/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or dis ases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out  a routin  basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
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Appendix 2: Quest onnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of arti le: …………………………………… …………… ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publi ation: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, xit) Yes  No  
b. Type  of inf ct ous disea e or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
. Type of p ints of ent y (airports, po ts, ground crossings) where measures were 
impl mented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried o t n a routin  basis or on an ad h c basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods us d in ntry/ xit screening (primary/secondary, questi nnaire, 
body emp rature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology us d (thermometers, scan cameras, o  other t chnology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis prot c l (labor t ry a d clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
i. Total numbe s of t avel rs screened for a specific ti frame Y s  No  
j. Percentag  of persons ositive to screening that were diagnosed with th  t rg t d disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentag  of persons diag osed with diffe ent disease from the ini ially argeted for the 
specific ti frame (positive and n gative predictiv  values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or target d scr ening (e.g., t aveler fro  any affected outbound country, 
al  t avelers directly arriving only from affected countri /areas, nationality of t av lers, t avelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the ntry/exit screening 
measures or the cos -effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Quest onnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry exit  
b. Types o  infect ous disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting  
c. Ty e of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out n a routin  basis  r on an a  hoc b sis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in ntry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temp rature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology us d: thermometers scan cameras  
l. General screening or targeted screeni g (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, all
travelers directly arriving only from affected countries/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers
in-transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Autho : …………………………………… Year of publi ation: ………………… 
 
a. Ty e of scre ning ( ntry, exit    No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Ty  of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  N   
d. S r ening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpo  Yes  N   
. D scription of m th d  used in entry/exit screening (primary/sec dary, questionnaire, 
body temperature ch ck, t chnology used) Yes  No  
f. Typ  of technology us d (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diag osis protocol (laboratory and clinical ex m nation) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total mber  f travelers scre ed for a sp cific ti eframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage f pers s iagnosed with diff re t d sease fr m the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative pr dictive values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or argeted s reen ng (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all trav ler  directly arriving only from affected countries/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screeni g: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of ntry: airpo ts  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurr d 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
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Appendix 2: Quest onnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
T tle of article: …………………………………… …………… ..………………………… 
Auth r: …………………………………… Year f publi ation: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, xit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infect ous disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Typ  of p ints of ent y (airports, po ts, ground crossings) where measures were 
impl ented Yes No  
d. Scr ening carried out n a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purp s Y s  No  
e. Description of meth d  us d in ntr /exit screening (primary/sec dary, questionnaire, 
body temp rature check, technology us d) Yes  No  
f. Typ  of tech ology us d (thermometers, scan cameras, o  other technology) 
g. After scre ning, the applied diagnosis protoc l (labor o y a  clinical ex mination) 
h. Number of cases ide tified for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
i. Total umbe s f t avel rs scre ed for a specific ti fr m Yes  No  
j. Perc ntag  of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with th  target d disease 
Yes  N   
k. Percentag  of p rsons iagnos d with differe t diseas  from th  ini ially targeted for the 
specific ti frame (positive and n gative predictiv  values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or arget d s reening (e.g., t aveler from any affected outbound country, 
all t av l rs directly arriving only from affected countrie /areas, nationality of t avelers, t avelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the ntry/exit screening 
measures or the cos -effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Quest onnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry exit  
b. Types of infect ous disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting  
c. Ty e of points of entry: airpo ts  ports  ground crossings  
d. Scre ning carried out n a routine basis  or on an ad hoc b sis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in ntry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temp rature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology us d: thermometers scan cameras  
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screeni g measures or
the cost-effectiveness of methods applied
Appendix C Questionnaire f ata Ex racti n
a. Type of screening: entry
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the target d dis ase 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the initially targeted or he 
specific timef ame (positive and negative pr dictiv  valu s) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from ny aff c e  outbound coun ry, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affected cou ries/areas, ati nality f travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the asse sment of th  public h alth impact of the ntry/ xit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applie  
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
exit
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checki g on ligib lity criteria 
Title of article: ……….. ……… 
Author: ……… Year of publication: ……… 
 
a. Type of scree ing ( ntry, xit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infectiou  disease or dise ses that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of p ints of ent y (airports, ports, ground crossings) wh re measures were 
impl mented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a pub ic health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
. Description of metho s us d in en ry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or ot er technology) 
g. Aft r screening, th  applied d agn sis protoc l (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases dentified for a specific ti eframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travel rs screened for a specific ti eframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were di gnosed wi h the target d disease 
Yes  No  
k. Perc ntage of persons iagnosed with different d sease from he initially targ ted for the 
specific ti eframe (positive and negative redictiv values) Yes No  
l. Ge ral creening or t rgeted scre ning (e.g., trav l  fr m a y aff c ed outb d country, 
al  travel rs directly arriving nly rom affected c untries/a eas, na ionality f travelers, travelers in-
transit that hav called an affected ou try/ar as (Wes  Africa)) Y s  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the n ry/exit creeni g 
measures or th  cost-effectiv n ss of method  appli  
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extractio   
a. Type of scre ing: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectiou  disease or dise ses that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  po ts  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a pub ic health event 
has occurred 
. Methods used in en ry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
tempera ure  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting
c. Type of points of entry: airports
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of scree ing (e tr , exit) Ye   No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or o  an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Perce ta e of persons diag osed with different isease from the i itially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive a d negative pre ictive values) Yes  N   
l. General screening or targeted screening ( .g., traveler from a y affected outbound c untry, 
all travelers directly arriving o ly from affected countries/areas, nationality of tr v lers, ravelers in-
tr nsit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Y s  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the en ry/exit creeni g 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of method  applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data xtraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
p rts
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Appendix 2: Questionn i for checkin  on eligibility cri ria 
Title of article: …………………………………………………… ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Typ  of scr ening (entry, exit) Ye   No  
b. Typ s of infectious disease or diseases th t entry and xit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, p rts, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out o  a routine basis or on an d hoc basis after a public h alt  event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description f methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type f technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Numb r of cases i entified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of trav lers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of ersons p sitiv  to screening that were diagnosed with the targ ted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diag osed with different disease from the initiall  targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive n  n gative predictive values) Yes  N   
l. Gen ral screening or targeted scr ening ( .g., t aveler from a y affected outbound country, 
all trav lers di ectly arriving only from aff cted countrie /area , nationality of travel rs, traveler  in-
transit that have called an affected c untry/areas (West Africa)) Yes  N   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the publi  health impact of th  entry/ xit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiven ss f methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for da a extraction  
a. Typ  of scr ening: ntry  exit  
b. Typ s of infectious disease or diseases th t entry and xit screening was targeti g  
c. Type of points of entry: air rts  ports  g und crossings  
d. Screening carried out o  a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public h alth event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/ xit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology us d  else  
f. Type f technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
gr und crossings
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Appe x 2: Que tionnaire f r check ng n ligibili y criteria 
Title of article: ….. ……………………… 
Author: ………………  Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Typ of scre nin  (entry, exit) Ye   No  
b. Types of infec ious disease or dis ase  that e try a d exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of point  of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Scre ing carried out on a rout ne basis or on an ad oc b sis aft r a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods us d  ent y/exit creening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
bo y mperatur  check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of chnology u d (thermomet rs, scan ameras, or other technology) 
g. After screeni g, the applied diagnosis protocol (l bor tory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases dentified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total number  o  t avelers s re ned for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. P rcen ag  f persons posit ve t  scree ing that w r dia nose  with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Perce ta e of persons di gnosed with different disease f om the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive d n gative predictive val es) Yes  No  
l. General scre ni g r target d scree ing ( .g., traveler fr m any affected out ound country, 
all travelers irectly arriving nly from affected cou trie / as, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that ave called ffec d country/ar as (Wes  Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Rep rting on assessment of he public h al h impact of the entry/ xit sc eening 
mea ures r the cost-eff ctiveness of eth ds applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: e try  exit  
b. Types of i fec ious diseas  or diseases that e t y and exit screening was targeting  
c. T pe of points of e try: airports  port   ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out n a routine basis  or on an d hoc basis  aft r a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
t mperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of chnology used: thermometers scan cameras  
d. Screeni g carried out on a routine basis
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking o  ligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………… ..…………… …… … 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a e of scr ening (entry, exit) Y   No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a ro tine basi  or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purp se Yes  No  
e. Description f meth ds sed in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technol gy used) Y s  No  
f. Type of ech ology used (th rm meters, scan cameras, or other technology  
g. A ter screening, the applied di gno is protocol (lab ratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identifie  f r  s ecifi  ti efr e s    
i. Total numbers of traveler  scree ed for a s c f c timefr me Y s  No  
j. Percentage of pers ns positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. P rcentage of p rsons diagnosed with differen  dis ase from the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positiv  and n gative predicti  values) Y s  No  
l. General screening o  t rg  sc eening (e.g., traveler from any aff cted outbound country, 
all tr lers dire tly arriving o ly from affect d c untries/areas, nationality of tr veler , travelers in-
transit hat have called an affec  country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  N    
m. Reporting on the assessmen  o  the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. e of screening: entry  exit  
b. e i fectious dise se  diseases that entry and exit creening was targeting  
c. Typ  of p ints of en ry: i ports  p rts  gr und cro sings  
d. Screening c rried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
tem rature  technology us d  els   
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
or on a ad hoc basis
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, x 48 of 65 
 
Canada http://www.ciphi.ca 
Nigeria https://ncdc.gov.ng  
Liberia http://moh.g v.lr/, http://liberiamohsw.org/Policies&Plan.html 
Sierra Leone http://health.gov.sl, ttp://gov.sl/mi istry-health-and-sanitation  
Mali http:// w.sante.gov.ml/ 
ICAO https://www.icao.int  
I TA  https://www.iata.org  
CAPSCA h tp ://www.capsca.org  
ACI https://aci.aero/  
CLIA https://cruising.org  
ISF http://www.allaboutshipping.co.uk  
UIC https://uic.org  
OTIF https://otif.org  
OSJD http://en.osjd.org 
CIT https://www.cit-rail.org  
ERRAC http://errac.org  
Appendix 2: Questi nnair  for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of articl : ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of scr ening (entry, exit) Ye  No  
b. Types of inf c ious disease or diseas s that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. T pe of points of entry (airp rts, ports, ground crossings) where measures were 
implem nted Yes  No  
d. Sc eeni g c rried ut on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurr d and its purpos  Ye   No  
e. Descripti  of methods used in entr /exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature heck, technology u ed) Ye   No  
f. Typ  of technology use  (thermomet s, sca  cameras, or other technology) 
g. After s re n ng, the app i d diagnosis protocol (l borat ry and clinical examination) 
h. N r of ases d ntified for  specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total umbers of travelers screen d for a specific imeframe Yes  No  
j. Percen age of persons positive to scre ning that we e diagno d with the targeted disease 
Ye   No  
k. Percentag  of persons diagno d with different disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific tim frame (posi e and g tive predictiv  values) Yes  N   
l. Gener l scree ing o arg t d scree ing ( .g., tr veler f om a y affected outbound country, 
all tr v lers dir ctly arriving nly f om affected c untries/ar as, n tio ality of travelers, travelers in-
r nsit that have called a  ffected country/ reas (W st Af ic )) Yes  No   
. Repor ing on th  assess ent of th  public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
m asure r th  c st-effect veness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Ques naire for data ex raction  
a. Type of scr ening: tr   exit  
b. Types of inf ctious di ease r d seas s that ent y nd exit screening was targeting  
c. Ty e of point  of e try: airp rts  ports  ground crossi gs  
d. Sc eeni g c rried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurre  
. M thods used in ntry/exit s reening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  techn logy used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
after a public health event
has occurr d
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire f r checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of scr ening ( try, exit) Yes  No  
b. Types f infectious disease or disea es that entry nd exit screenin  was targeting Y s  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, ports, grou d crossings) where m a ures were 
im lemented Yes  No  
d. Scree ing carri d out on a routine basis or on a  ad hoc basi  after a public health event has 
occurr d and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Descripti n of m thods used in entr /exit sc eening (primary/second ry, questionnaire, 
body te perature c eck, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After sc eening, th  appli d diagnosi  protocol (laboratory nd clini al examination) 
h. Number of cases identifi d for a s cific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numb rs of travelers screene  for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons p itive to scre ni g that w re diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons iagnos d with differ nt disease from the initially targeted or he 
specific t meframe (positi e and negative predic iv  values) Y s  No  
l. General screening or targ ted screening (e.g., travel r from any affected outbound country, 
all travele s directly arriving only from affec ed countries/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit tha hav  called a  affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. R porting on the a s ssment of the public health imp ct of the entry/exit screening 
measure r the cost-effectiveness of metho s applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious dis ase or di eases that entry and exit creeni g w s targe ing  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carri d out on a routine basis  o  on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Me hods used in entry/exit screening: prim ry  s condary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
secondary
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Appendix 2: Questio na re f r checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………… ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Y ar of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening ( ntry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Typ of infecti us disea e or diseases that e try a d exit screening wa  targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of poi ts of ntry (airports, port , g ound rossings) wh e m asures were 
im lemente  Yes  No  
d. Screening arried out on a r uti e b s s r on an d hoc basis after a public ealth event has 
o c rred and it  urpos  e     
e. Description f th ds used in entry/exit scr ening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temp rature check, tech ol gy used) es  o  
f. Type of technol gy used (thermo eters, scan ameras, or other technology) 
g. After screen g, th  applied iag osis p o col (lab ratory and clinical examination) 
h. Numb r o  cases id ntified for a sp cific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers scre ne  for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percent e f pers n  posit ve o scre ning that were diagno d with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of perso s diagnosed with different dis ase from the initi lly argeted for the 
specif c timeframe (positive and egative pr dictive values) Y   No  
l. G er l sc e ning or targ ted screening (e.g., traveler fro any affected ou bound country, 
all travele s directly a r ving only from aff cted cou tr es/ r as, n tionality of travel rs, trav lers in-
tra s that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on he assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
m asures or he cost-ef ective e s f m thods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of scr ening: entry  exit  
b. Type of infectious d sea e or diseases that entry a d exit screening was argeting  
c. Type of points f entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine ba is  r on an ad hoc basis  afte  a public health ev nt 
as occurred 
e. Methods us d in ntry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questi nnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology us d: thermomet s scan cameras  
questionnaire
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Appe ix 2: Qu stion aire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: …….. ………………… 
Author: ………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of creening (entry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Typ  f infecti s disease or dis ases th t ntry a d exi  scr ing was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Ty e of i ts f e try (ai p rts, port , rou d crossings) wher  measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
. Scre ni g carri d out on a routine basis or on an d hoc basis f er a public he lth event has 
occ rred and its purp se Yes  No  
e. D sc iptio  of m thods used in e try/ex t creening (primary/seco dary, questionnaire, 
bo y tem ratu e check, techn logy used) Yes  N   
f. Type of tec nology used (thermo ters, scan cameras, r other technology) 
g. After screening, the p li d di gnos s protocol (laboratory and cli ical examination) 
h. Numb  f c ses d nt fi d for specific imefr me Yes  No  
i. Tot l numbe s of traveler  scr en  for specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of per ons positive o sc ening th t ere iagnos d with the target d disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percenta e o  p rsons iagnosed with d ffere t d s ase from th  initially targeted for the 
spec fic m f ame (positiv  and negative predictiv  values) Yes  No  
l. G n r l scr ning or target d screening (e.g., r veler from any affected outbound country, 
all tr velers directly arriving only from affec ed countr s/a s, atio ality of t avel rs, travelers in-
tr nsit t at h ve c lled an aff c ed country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Repor i g o  th  as essment of e public health impact of th  entry/exit screening 
m a r s o  th ost-effectiveness of ethods applied 
Appe di  3: Ques ionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type  scree ing: entry  exit  
b. Typ s of infectious di ease or dis ases th t entry a d exi  scr e ing was targeting  
c. Type of points of ent y: airp rts  p rts  ground crossings  
d. Scr ni g car ied out on a routine basi   or on a  ad hoc basis  f er a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  s con ary  questionnaire  body 
temp rature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technol gy used: thermometers scan cameras  
body temperature
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………… ..  
Author: …………………………………… Year of publicati n: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screeni g was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, orts, gro nd cros ings) where mea ures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis o  on  ad oc asis after a public h alth event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit scr eni g (primary/s conda y, questionnaire,
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or oth technolo y) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis proto ol (laboratory a d cli cal examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  N  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Ye   No 
j. Percentage of persons positive to s re ning that w re diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from th  initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative predictive v lu s) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., t ave  from any affected utb u d country, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affe t d countri s/ ea , na on lity of travelers, trav rs in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Ye  N   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the blic heal h impact of the try/exit creening
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entr  and exit screening w s targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basi   or on an d hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  que tionnair   b d
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
technolog used
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………… ..  
Author: …………………………………… Year of public tion: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entr , xit) Yes  No  
b. Type  of infectiou disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of try (airports, ports, ground cros ing ) h re measures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Screening carried out on  rout ne basis or on an ad ho  ba is after a public h alth vent has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods us d in ntry/exit scr e in  (prima y/secon ary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Y s  N   
f. Type of t chnology used (ther om ters, scan cameras or othe  t ch ol gy) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis proto ol (labor tory d cli ical ex ina on) 
h. Number f ca es iden ifi d for a specific timefram  Yes  No  
i. Total numb rs of travelers sc e fo  a spec fic timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentag  of pe so s positiv  to screening that were dia nosed with the target  isease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with dif er t se se f om the i iti ly t rg ted for th  
specific timeframe (positive and negativ  predictiv  values) Yes  No  
l. General screeni g or targ ed screening (e.g., trav ler from a  affected outbound cou ry, 
all travelers directly rriving o ly from affe t d c untri s/areas, tion ty of travel rs, travelers in-
transit that have called a  affected country/areas (We t Africa)) Y s  No   
m. Reporting n the assessment of th  ublic alth impact of the entry/exit screening 
m asures or the cost-effectiveness of meth ds pplied
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit 
b. Types of infectiou is ase or diseases that ntry a d exi  sc een ng was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  gr nd crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a outi e basis  o  on an d hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secon ary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology u ed: thermometers scan cameras  
else
f. Type of technology used: thermo eters sca cameras
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and cli ical examination)
h. Number of cases identifi d and the total numbers o travele s screened
i. Percentage of perso s po itive to s r n ng finally iagnosed
j. Percentage of persons diagnosed wi diff r nt disease from he ini ially targe ed
k. The applied protocol after diagnosis and man gement of cases
l. Health measures applied to the traveler and the environment
m. Gen ral scr ning r targe scr ening: ou bound country
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of articl : ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Y ar of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Typ  of screening ( ntry, xit) Yes  No  
b. Types f i f ctio disease or diseas s that entry and exit screening wa targeting Yes  No 

c. Ty e f poi ts of ntry (airpor s, port , ground c ossings) where measures were 
implemented Yes  N   
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a publi  health vent has 
occurre  and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Descriptio  of methods u d in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
bo y tempera ure check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screeni g, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific ti efra e Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affected countries/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
travelers ir ctly ar iving from
affec ed countries
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of articl : …………………………………… ….. ……………… 
Author: …………………………………… Ye r of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening ( ntry, exit) Y  No  
b. Types f i fectious di eas  or diseases that entry a d exit sc eening was t rg ting Yes  N  
 
c. Typ  of points of entry (airp rts, po ts, ground crossi g ) wh e measures were
implemented Yes  No  
d. Scre ning carried out on a routin  basis or  an a  hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. D scri tion of methods used in nt y/exi  scr e ing (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology sed (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (lab ratory and clinical ex mination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a sp cific timeframe Ye   No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the initially targeted for th  
specific timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler f om any affected outbound country, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affected countries/areas, n tionali y of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was argeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: p imary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
n t nality
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: …………………… ……………….. ………  
Author: ……………… Y ar of publication: ……………… 
 
. Ty e of scre n ng (ent y, exit) Yes  No  
b. Typ s of inf c i u  di as  or diseases hat entry and exit scre ni  wa  t rgeting Y s  No 
 
c. Typ  of points of ntry (airpo t , po t , ground crossi gs) w ere mea ures w re 
impl m nted Yes  No  
d. Scre ning c ried ut on a routine basis or o  a  ad h c bas s aft r a public health event has 
occur ed and its purpos  Yes  No  
e. Descript on f meth s us d in entry/ xit screenin  (primary/s cond ry, qu stionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Ty e of tech ology use  (ther omet rs, sc n cameras, r other techn l gy) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clin al examination) 
h. Number of cases identif ed for a specific timefram  Ye   No  
i. T tal number  of travele s scr ened for a s cific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of p rs ns positive to scr ening that were diagnosed with th  targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnos d with diffe ent disease from the initially target d for the
specific timefr me (posi and negati  p edictiv  values) Yes  No  
l. General scr ening or ta get d creening (e.g., trave er fro  any affe ted outbound country, 
all travelers direct arriving only fr m affected coun ries/ar as, nationality of travelers, travel rs in-
transit that h v  called a  affect d country/a e s (West Africa)) Y s  No  
m. Reporting on the asse sment of the public health impact of the ntry/exit screening 
measur s or th  cost-e fectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of inf ctious di ase or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Typ  of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening c ried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in ntry/exit screening: primary secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometer scan cameras  
tra el rs in-tran it
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Appendix 2: Ques ionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title f l : …….. …………… 
Author: ……………………  Year of publicatio : ………………… 
 
a. Typ  of r ni g ( nt y, xit) Yes  No  
b. Types of inf ctious disease r ise se  that entry nd exit screeni g was tar eting Yes  No 
 
c. Type f i t o  entry ( irports, p rts, ground crossings) where me sur s w r  
implemente  Yes  No  
d. Sc ning carri  ut o  a routine or o  an d hoc basis after a public health eve t has 
occurred nd its purpos  Yes  No  
. Descr p io of met od  used in entry/exit s reeni g (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature ch ck, t c l  s ) Y s  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or ther technology) 
g. After screening, the ppl e  d agn sis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number cases dentified for a pecific timef me Yes  No  
i. Total numb rs of travelers screened for a p cific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of p so s positiv  to scre nin that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentag  of pers ns diag os d w th diff re t disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positiv  and egative pr ictiv  values) Yes  No  
l. Gen ral i  or targeted scre ning (e.g., traveler fr m ny ffected outbound country, 
all tr v lers direc ly rriving o ly from ffected coun ies/areas, na iona ity of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called a  affected country/areas (West Africa)) Y s  No   
m. R porti g on the assessmen  of th  public heal h impact of the entry/exit screening 
measur s or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. T pe of scr ening: n ry  exit  
b. Types of i f ctious d seas  or iseases that e try and exi  scree ing was targeting  
c. Type of p ints of ent y: airports  ports  ground crossi gs  
d. Screening carried out on a routin  basi   or on an ad ho  basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used i  ntry/exit scr ning: pr mary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  t chnol gy used  else  
f. Type of technology used: th rmometers scan cameras  
n. Int r-sect r l c llaborati and c r inat o pr ce s
o. Involved ffic rs: Public health officers
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checki g on ligibility criteri  
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Y ar of publication: ………………… 
 
a. T pe of sc eening (entr , xi ) Ye   No  
b. Types of infectious diseas o  diseases h t ent y a  exit screeni g w s ta geting Y s  No 
 
c. Typ  of poin  ntry ( irports, po , grou d c os ings) where m asure  were 
imple ented Yes  N   
d. Screening carried ut n a r u in  basis or o  an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description f meth ds used n entry/exit scre ning (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body tem erature c eck, techn logy used) Yes  N   
f. Type of technology used (ther ometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laborat ry a d clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diag osed with different isease from the initially targeted for the 
specific timefra e (positive and negative predictive values) Yes  N   
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all travelers directly arriving o ly from affected cou tries/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Y s  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of i fectious disease or iseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Met ods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
ini try officer
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on eligibility criteria 
Title f article: ……………………………………… ..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Typ  f scre ni g ( try, exit) Yes  N   
b. Typ s of i f tiou dis a  o  ea s that ntry and xit scree ng was t rgeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of po ts of try (ai ports, ports, g ound crossi g ) here measures were 
implem nted Yes  No  
d. Scree ing carrie  out o  a r utine basis o  o  d ho basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Ye   No  
e. D sc ip f methods used in entry/exit scree ing (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body tem erature check, ech ology used) Yes  N   
f. Type of t chnology used (thermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
. After screeni g, the applied diagnosis protocol (lab ratory a d clinical examination) 
h. Number f ca es iden fied for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numb rs of travelers screene  for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of pe so s positive to screening that were di gnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of perso s iag osed with differe t disease f om the initially targeted for the 
s ec f c timeframe (positive a d negative predictive values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targe ed screening (e.g., traveler fro  a y affec ed outbound country, 
all t avelers directly rriving only f om affected c untries/are s, nation lity of travelers, travelers in-
tra sit t at have called a  affected country/area (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
m asures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Ty e of scree i g: e try  exit  
b. Types of infectiou  disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods u ed i  entry/exit screening: p imary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature technology used  else  
f. Type of t chnology u ed: thermometers scan cameras  
r i nal alth system
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Appen x 2: Questionnaire for ch cking on eligibility criteria 
Title of rticle: … …………………..………………………… 
Author: ………………………  Year of publication: ………………… 
 
. Typ  f c ening (entry, xit) Y s  No  
b. Ty s of nf ct ous dise s  or di eas s that nt y and exit scree ing was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. T pe p ints of entry (ai ports, port , ground crossings) where measures were 
implem nted Y s  N   
. Screening carried out on a r utine b sis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
ccurre  and its purpose Yes  No  
. Descr ption of methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body tempe at r check, technol gy use ) Y s  No  
f. Type of techn logy used (thermo eters, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After scree ing, the applied diag os s protocol (labor ory and clinical examination) 
h. Nu ber of cases i entifi d for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screen d for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Perc ntage of persons positive to scr en ng that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diag osed with iffer nt disease from  initially targeted for the 
spec fic timefram  (positi e nd egati e predictive values) Yes  No  
l. G neral sc eening or t rgeted scree ing ( .g., traveler from a y affected outbound country, 
all travelers directly arr vi g o ly f om affected coun ies/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transi  that have c ll d an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measur s or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appen ix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious dise se or diseas s that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of po of entry: ai ports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out o   ro tine basis  or on an ad oc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Me hods used in ent /exi  screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperatur  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
national
health syste
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for checking on lig bility criteria 
Title of article: ……………… ………..  
Author: …………………………………… Ye  f publicati n: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Types of inf ctious diseas  or di a es that en y and exit sc ee i g w s targeti g Y s  No 
 
c. Type of points of entry (airports, po ts, g ound cr s ings) where meas es w re 
implemented Yes  N   
d. Screening carried o t on  rou ine basi  or on an ad hoc basis afte a public health ev nt has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/ex t sc eening (p imary/sec ndary, qu stionnaire, 
body temperat re check, technology used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (th mometers, sca  cam ras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagn sis protocol (laboratory an  clinical exami ation) 
h. umber of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers s reened for a specific timeframe Y s  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of perso s d agnosed with differe t dis ase from the i itially targ ted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Y s  No 
l. General screening or targete  screening (e. ., trav ler from a y affect d outboun  co try,
all travelers directly arriving only from affect  countries/areas, nation lity of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of he public health impa of the en ry/exit scr ening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious isease or diseases that entry nd exit cre ing was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground cr ssings 
d. Screening carried out on a routine b sis  o  on an ad hoc basis  afte  a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screenin : primary  sec ndary  q estionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
GOs
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Appendix 2: Questi nnaire for check ng o  eligibility criteria 
T t  of article: …………..  
Author: ………… Y r of publication: ………… 
 
a. Type of scre ning (ent y, exit) Ye   No  
b. Types of infec ou  is e or dis as s that ntr  and exit s reenin  w  arg ting Y s  No 
 
c. Type of poi s of ntry ( ir o ts, p rts, g  cro sing ) w ere m as res we e
implemented Yes  No  
d. S reening carried t on a ro tine basis r on an ad hoc b si after a blic health event has 
occurred and its pur ose Y   No 
e. Description of m thods us d in entry/exit scre ning (pri ary/secondary questionnaire, 
body te peratur  check, techn logy used) Yes  No  
f. Type of technology used (th mometers, sc n cameras, or ther techn logy)
g. After scre ni g, the ap lied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clin cal examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a sp cific tim frame Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of t av lers sc eene  for a sp cific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were iagnosed with the target d disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons iagnose  with ff re t d as  fro  the initially ta get d for the 
sp cific timefram (positive and negative predictiv  valu s) Yes  No  
l. Gener  sc eening or ta geted scre ning ( .g., travel r f m any aff ted outboun  country, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affect d countri s/ re s, na ion lity of travelers, trav lers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Repor ing on the assess nt of th  public e l h impact of e entry/ x t screening 
measures or th  cost-effectiveness of metho s applied 
Appendix 3: Questi nn ire fo  data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exi   
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit scree in  was targeti g  
c. Type  points of entry: airpo ts  po ts  grou d cros ings  
d. S reening carried t on a routine basis  or on an ad h  basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/ x t screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: th mometers sc n cameras  
el e
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Appe dix 2: Question aire for checking on eligib lity c iteria 
Title f article: …… ..  
A thor: ……… Year of publi ation: ……… 
 
a. Typ  of scre ing ( nt y, xit) Y  No 
b. Types of inf ctiou  di a or di e s s h t try and x  s r ing was ta g ting Y s  No 
 
c. Ty  of p ints of e ry ( irports, p rt , roun  rossings) w  measure were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. S reeni g carried out n a routine basis or on n ad h c basi f er a publ c health event has 
occurr d and its purpose Yes  No  
. D scription of m tho s us d i en ry/ x t screen  (p im r / eco dary, ques ionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology used) Yes  N   
f. Type of tec nology used (t rmomet rs, scan c mer s, r ot er technology) 
g. After scre ning, th  ap lied d agn sis protoc l (labor tory d cl nical examination) 
h. Number of c ses d ntified for  specific timefram  Y s  No  
i. Tot l numbers of travel r  cr ened for  s cific timefr me Y s  No 
j. P rcentage f person  positive o sc ening that were diagnos d wi h the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Per entage f persons d agnosed with differ nt dise s  fro  h initially target d for the 
specific meframe (positive and ne ative p di tive values) Yes  No  
l. Gener l scr ening or targ ted scre ning (e.g., trave r fro  any affe ted outb d country, 
all tr vel s directly arriving nly rom affected count ies/ar a , na ionality of t v lers, travelers in-
tr nsit that have call d an affected country/ar as (West Africa)) Y s  No   
m. R porting o  the assessment of e public health i pact of h  n ry/exit screening 
measures or th  cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appe dix 3: Ques ionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of scr ing: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectiou  di ease or dise ses that ent y and exi  scr e  was ta geting  
c. Type of points of entry: airp rts  po t   ground crossings  
d. Screeni g carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  f er a public health event 
has occurred 
. Metho s us d in n ry/exit scr ni g: primary  s condary  que tionnair  body 
tempera ure  technology used  else  
f. Type of tec nology used: thermometers scan cameras  
p. Concret example of try/ xit scr ni g
q. P actices, expe ences, and l sso s l rnt re ort d
r. Challeng s r po t d (li itations, failures, mishaps)
s. Bad practices reported
t. Methods used to assess the public health impact of the entry/exit screening and their result
u. Methods used to appraise the cost-effectiveness of screening method and results
v. Evaluation of method results: sensitivity
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A dix 2: Questi naire for checki g o  ligibility c ri
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Typ s f inf ctio s isease r iseases t at e  a  e it scree i  as tar etin  Yes  No 
 
of points of tr  ( irp t , ports, grou d ro ings) where m asures were 
implemented Yes  No  
d. Scre ning carri d ou o  a r u in  bas s or on an d h c ba is after  bl c health event has 
occur ed a d its p p e Yes  No  
. D sc iption f methods u d i  e tr /exit cr ning (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technolog  ) Y s  No  
f. T p  of technol y used (thermom ters, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After scr ening, the applied diagnosis protocol ( aboratory and clinic l exami ation) 
h. Numb r of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affected countries/areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
App ndix 3: Qu stionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
specificity
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A pendix 2: Que ti n r f r ch cki g on i ibility c it a 
Title of article: … .. ……………… 
Author: ……………… Year of publication: ……………… 
 
a. T p  of cree ing ( try, xit) Yes  No  
b. Type of infectious disease or iseases that ent y and exit creening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Typ  of poi ts of ry ( i p rts, port , gr und rossings) where m as res were 
implemente  Yes  No  
. Screeni g ca ied out o   utine b is or o  an d h c b is after a public ealth event has 
c urred and it purpose Ye   No 
. Description f m t ods used in y/exit screening (p imary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body temperature ch ck, t chnology us d) Yes  No  
f. Type of t chnol gy s d ( hermomet , sc n cameras, or ther technology) 
g. After scr ening, the ap lied diag sis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Numb r o  cas s identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers scre ned for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of person  positive o scre ning that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different dis ase from the initially argeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative pr dictive values) Yes  No  
l. Ge eral sc e ning or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected ou bound country, 
all travele s directly arriving only fr m aff cted cou tr es/ reas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have alled an affected country/areas (W st Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
m asures or he cost-ef ectivene s of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Q esti nnaire f r data extracti n  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Type of infectious disease or diseases that entry a d exit creening was targeting  
c. Type of points f entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening car ied out on a routine basis  r on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods us d in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questi nnaire  body 
temperature  t chnology used  else  
f. Type of t chnology us d: thermomet rs scan cameras  
false positive/negative
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Appe dix 2: Questio  fo ch king on elig bility criteria 
Title of article: ………………..………………………… 
Autho : …………………………  Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of creening (entry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infectious dis se or diseas s that e try and exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Typ  of points of ent y ( irports, ports, ground c ossings) where measures were 
implement  Yes  No  
. Scree i carri d ut on a utine basis  on a  a  hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred an  ts purpose Yes  No  
e. D cr ption of methods u d in entr /exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
b y t mperat r  ch ck, technol gy us d) Yes  No  
f. Typ  of technology u d ( hermometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. Af r creening, he applied diagnosis prot col (labor ory and clinical examination) 
h. Numb r of cases id ntified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of traveler  screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Perc ntage of persons positive to scr ening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed wi h diff rent dis ase from initially targeted for the 
sp cific timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Yes  No  
l. G neral scr ening or t rgeted scree ing ( .g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all trav le s directly arrivi g only from affected count ies/areas, national ty of travelers, travelers in-
transit that have call d an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the c st-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appen ix 3: Questi nnaire f r dat  extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious dis ase or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of poin of entry: ai ports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screeni g carried out o a routine ba is  or on an ad oc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
. Me hods used in e t /exit screeni g: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperatur   technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
(of screening
method)
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Appendix 2: Qu stionnaire for checking on eligibility r t ria
Title of article: ……………………… .. …………  
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entry, exit) Yes  N   
b. Types of infectious disease or diseas s that entry a  exit scr enin  was t rgeti g Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points f ntry (airports, orts, ground cr ss gs) where me sur w re 
im l mented Yes  No  
d. Screening carri d out on a routine basis o   a  ad hoc basis fter a pu l c h lth ve  has 
occurred and its purpos  Yes  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/ xit cre ning (primary/s co da y, questionnaire, 
body temperature check, technology us d) Y s  No  
f. Type of technology used (thermom t rs, scan cam r s, or ot er technology) 
g. After screening, t  applied diagnosis pr tocol (la o atory and clin al exa in tion) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  N   
i. Total numbers of travelers screen d for a specifi  timeframe Yes  N   
j. Percentage of persons po itive to scr ening that were diagnos d with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the nitially targ ted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Ye   No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affect d tbound country, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affected countries/ r as, natio ality of travel s, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (West Afric )) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of p blic health impact of th  entry/exit scr ening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questi nnaire f r data xtracti n  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseas s that entry a d ex t screening was ta geti g  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  groun  crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routin  basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  q estionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
positiv a d negativ edictiv valu
w. Decision-making level: Public health officers
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Appe dix 2: Qu s ir  o  h cking n eligibilit  riteria 
Title of article: … ………………………………………..………………………… 
Au hor: …………………………………… Year f publication: ………………… 
 
a. Typ  of screening (entry, xit) Yes  No 
b. Types of infectious di ase r diseases that e try and screeni g was tar ting Yes  No 
 
c. Typ of p ints of entry (a t , ports, nd crossing ) where m asures wer  
impl ment d Yes  No  
d. Scre ning carr ed out on a outin basis r on an ad hoc basis after  public health event has 
occurr d and it  purpose Yes  No  
e. D scripti of t ods used n ntry/ xit screening (p imary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body tem rature c k, technolo y used) Y  N   
f. Type f technolog  used (th rm met rs, s an ca ras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis prot col (l boratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a sp cific timeframe Ye   No  
i. Total numb s of travelers screen d for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentag  f p rsons positive to scr ing th t w re i s  it  the targeted di ase 
Y s  No  
k. Perc ntag  f persons diagnos d with diff re t dise s  from th  initially targe d for the 
specific tim frame (positive and nega ive predi iv  val es) Yes  N   
l. Ge e al sc ning or targ ted s re ing (e.g., traveler fr m a y affected outbound country, 
all tr velers direc ly arriving only from aff cted countries/are s, natio ality of travele s, t velers in-
transi  th t have call d an af e d country/ar as (W st Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
. Typ  of screening: ent y  exit  
b. Types of infectious diseas  r diseases that entry and exit scr ening was a geting  
c. Type f points of entry: airpo ts  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out o  a routine basis  or on an ad hoc ba i   after a public health eve t 
has occurred 
e. M t ods used in entry/exit screening: primar   secondary  que tionnair   body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
ministry officers
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Appendix 2: Que tion aire for che king n eligibility criteria 
Title of articl : ……………………….. ……………………… 
Author: ……………………… Year of publicati n: ………………… 
 
a. Type f s reening ( ntry, it) Yes  No  
b. Typ s f i fectious di ase or dis ase that entry nd exit scr ening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Typ  of p i  f entry ( irports, port , ground cro sings) where meas res were 
implemen ed Yes  No 
. Scr ening carr ed out  routin  basis r on an ad h c b sis after a public h alth event has 
occurr d and i s pur e Yes  No  
e. D cription of ethods u d in nt y/exit scr ening (pri a y/secondary, questionnaire, 
body tempera ure check, techn lo y u ed) Yes  No  
f. Type of techn logy us d (therm ters, scan cameras, o  other technology) 
g. A t r scr ening, th  appli d diagno is p tocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number f cas s identi ied for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of tr vel rs scr ened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. P ce tage f p sons posi ive to scr ening tha  were iagno d with the targeted diseas  
Yes  No  
k. Per en ge of persons diagn sed wi h diff re t disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific t efram  (positive a  nega ive predictive valu s) Yes  No  
l. Gener l scre ning o  targ ted s ening (e.g., tr veler from any aff cted outbound country, 
ll travelers di ectly arriving only fro  ff cted coun ries areas, nationality of travelers, travelers in-
tran it that have call d an ffect d cou try/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting n the assessm nt of the public health impact of the entry/exit screening 
measures or the cos -effectiven ss of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Qu stionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious dis as   di ase  that try nd exit screening was targeting  
c. T pe of points f entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
. Screening carried out o  a routine basis  o o  an d hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods u d  n y/exit scre ni g: primary  se ondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
regional
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App ndix 2: Q e tio n ir  f r checking on eligibil ty crit ria
Titl  of article: .. …………… 
Author:  Year  publication: …………… 
 
a. Typ  of sc eening (entry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Types of infecti us disea e or d ase  that ntry a exit cre ning was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of en ry (ai port , ports, ground c ossings) wh re measur s were 
impl me ted Yes  No  
. Scr ing carried out o  a routi  basi or on an ad hoc basis after a public he lth event has 
ccurred nd it  u p se Y   No  
. D sc ipti n f metho s u d in nt y/exit screeni g (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
b dy te peratu  check, te hno ogy used) Yes  N   
. Type of e hnology u ed (thermometers, can cameras, or ther technology) 
g. Aft r sc eening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a pecif c timefram Yes  No  
i. Tot l numb of trav lers scr ened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Perc ntage of p rso s positiv  t  scre ni g that wer  diagnosed with the t rgeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. P rcent g  of per ons diagn sed w h diff e t disease from th  initially targeted for the 
specif c tim frame (p sitive and negative pre ictive v lues) Yes  No  
. G ral scr e ing o targeted scre ning (e.g., tr veler from any affected outbound country, 
all trav le s directly a riving only fr m affect d countri s/ar as, nationality of trav l rs, trav lers in-
tr sit that have calle  a  affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the assessment of the public health impac  of the entry/exit screening 
measures r the cost-effectivenes of methods applied 
App ndix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of sc eening: e try  exit  
b. Typ  of nfecti us ise se or dise es th t e try nd exit screening was targeting  
. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Scr ening carried out on a routi  b sis  or on a  ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occ rr d 
e. M th ds used i  entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers can cameras  
national
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App d x 2: Que tio na re for h cking on eligibility criteria 
Title of article: ………… .. …………… 
Au hor: …………………………………… Year of publication: …………… 
 
a. Type of sc ee ing (entry, exit) Yes  No  
b. Types of f cti us disease r di eas s that entry nd exit screening was targeting Yes  No 
 
c. T pe of point  f entry (airp rt , ports, g ound cros ings) wh re measures were 
implem nt d Y s  No 
d. Scr n g c rried out o   rou e bas s o on a  ad hoc basis aft r a public h lth event has 
ccurr d d ts urp e Yes  No  
. D ripti n of methods us d in entry/exit scre ning (pr mary/s condary, questionnaire, 
b dy tem rature ch k, echnology used Yes  N   
. Typ  o  techn logy used (therm meters, a  cameras, or other technology) 
g. After s r ening, the applied diag os s proto o (laborat ry and clinical examination) 
h. Nu ber f cases de tifi d for a sp cific imeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numb of trav lers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Perc ntage of persons positiv  to screen ng at w re diagno d with the targeted disease 
Y s  N  
k. Percent ge o  per ons di g os  with diff r nt diseas  fr m the initially targeted for the 
spec fic timefr m  (positi  nd negative pr dictive a ues) Yes  No  
. General sc ee i g or targeted scree ing (e.g., tr veler from any affected outbound country, 
al  travelers directly rr v ng onl f om aff cted countri s/ar a n tionality of t av lers, travelers in-
transit tha ha  calle  an affected country/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Repor ing on the assessment of the public health mpac  of the entry/exit screening 
measur  or the cost-effectivenes of methods applied 
App ndix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Typ  f sc eening: entry  exit  
b. Types of fecti us di ea e or dise s s at entry d exit screening was targeting  
c. Ty of po ts of entry: airp rts  ports  ground crossings  
d. Scr eni g carried ut on a ro tine sis  or on n ad hoc basis  ft r a public health event 
has occurred 
. Method  used in entry/exi  creening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temp rature  technology used  else  
f. Typ  of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
intersectoral collaboration
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire f r checking on ligibility criteria 
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..  
Author: …………………………………… Year of publication: ………………… 
 
a. Type of screening (entr , xit) Y s  N   
b. Typ s of inf c i us disease r diseas that e try an  exit screening was t rgeting Yes  No
 
c. Type of poi ts f ent y (airports, p rts, g oun rossings) wh re me ures were 
im lemented Y s No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis or on an ad c b si ft  public h alth v t has 
o cur ed and its purpos  e    
e. Description of thod used i  entry/ xit scr ening (p imary/ ondary, questi n ir , 
bod  t mp atur  c eck, technol gy us ) Yes  No  
f. Type of technol y used (the ometers, an camer s, r other technology) 
g. After screening, th  applied diag o i  protocol (lab ratory and cli ical x min t n) 
h. Numb r of cases id nt fied for a sp c ic tim f ame Y s  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers scr ened for a spe ific t mef ame Y   No  
j. Percent e of per ons positiv  to screening th t were diagnose  with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Pe centage of persons di gnosed with different d s ase  th  n ti lly t ge ed for the 
specif c timeframe (positive and neg tive predictive v lues) Yes  No  
l. G neral screening  targ t d scree ing ( .g., trav r from a y ffected outbound cou t , 
all travel rs directly arriving only from ff ct d c un rie /a as, nationality of r velers, travel rs in-
transit that have called an affected cou try/areas (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the a sessment of the public health imp ct of th en ry/exit scr ing 
measures or the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: tr   exit  
b. Types of infectious diseas  or disea es th t entry and xit screening was a geting
c. Type of points of entry: airports  po t   grou d crossings  
d. Screening carried o t on  r utine basis  or on an d hoc basis  after a public h alth event 
as occurred 
e. Methods us d in nt y/exit scr ening: p imary  secondary  questio nair   body 
temperature  technology used  else 
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
h alth a d bor er uthorities
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App ndix 2: Que t nair  f checki  on eli ibility riteria 
itl  of articl : … ..  
Author: ………………………  Year of publicati n: ………………… 
 
. f scre i  (entr , xit) Y  N
. f i i  i s  t r ti  Yes  No 
 
c Ty f p ints f e t y ( rport , ports, ground s gs) w er  measures were 
implemente Yes  No  
d. Scre ni g carr ed ut   ro tin basis or on an ad hoc b i  after a p blic health event has 
o urred and i s purp se Y s  No 
. D sc ip ion f m tho s us d i  entry/ xit s r eni g (primary/s conda y, questionnaire, 
b dy t p r tu e ch ck, technol gy used)     
f. Typ  of te h olo y u ed (t e m s, sc  cam r s, or othe  te hnology) 
g. Aft r sc ening, t e p lied diagno is prot col (laborat y and clinic l examination)
. Numbe  of ca es d ntified for a specific ti eframe Yes  No 
i. T tal numb rs of rav ler  screene  fo  a p i ic t mefr m  Y s  No  
j. Perce tage of ersons positiv  t  scr ening tha  were diagnosed with th  targeted disease 
Y s  No  
k. P rcentage o  persons gnos  w th different dise s from th  initially t rget d for the 
sp cific tim frame (positive and egativ  pr dictive valu s) Yes  No  
l. G eral sc e ning or ta g ed scr ning (e.g., tra eler r m any ff c  ou b und c untry, 
all travelers dire tly a i ing only from ff ct d coun ri s/ r as, nation li y of tr velers, travelers in-
transit that have call d an affected cou try/areas (Wes  Africa)) Y   No   
m. Reporting on the a ses ment of the public h a th imp ct of the entry/exit screening 
measures r the cost-effectiveness of methods applied 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of scre ing: e tr   exit 
b. Typ of infect us iseas r dise es th  en ry and exit sc eening was targeting  
c. Ty  of points of entry: airp r s  ports  r und cr s i g   
d. Screening c ri  out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has ccurred 
. M thod  used in ent y/exit scre ning: prima  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  lse 
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
x. Communication chann ls
y. Notification prac ces betwe neighboring and po sibly affected countries
z. Specifi timefram r fer Yes
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Appendix 2: Questi nnaire for checking on elig bility riteri  
Title of article: ……………………………………………………………..………………………… 
Au hor: …………………………………… Ye r of ublicatio : ………………… 
a Type of scre ning ( n y, xit)   No  
b. Types f in ectious dis ase or dis as s that e try d exit scre n g was targeting Y s  No 
 
c. Ty  of p ints of ntry (ai p r s, port , ground crossings) w re measures wer
i plem nted Y s  No  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis r on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurre  and its purpos  Y s  No  
e. Description of methods used in entry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body te erature check, tech ology used) Y s  No  
f. Type of technology used (the mometers, scan cameras, or other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protocol (laboratory and clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
i. Total numbers of travelers screened for a specific timeframe Yes  No  
j. Percentage of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with the targeted disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentage of persons diagnosed with different disease from the initially targeted for the 
specific timeframe (positive and negative predictive values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or targeted screening (e.g., traveler from any affected outbound country, 
all travelers directly arriving only from affected cou ies/areas, nationality of avelers, travelers in-
transit that have called an affected country/areas (W t Africa)) Yes  No  
m. Reporting on the asses m t f he ublic h alth im a t th ent y/exit c eenin  
measures r the cost-effectiveness of meth d  ap li  
Appendix 3: Questionnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry  exit  
b. Types of infectious disease or diseases that entry and exit screening was targeting  
c. Type of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out on a routine basis  or on an ad hoc basis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in entry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temperature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology used: thermometers scan cameras  
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Appendix 2: Qu st on aire or checking n eligibilit  crit ri  
Title of article: …………………………………… …………… ..………………………… 
Autho : …………………………………… Y r o  publicat on: …………………
 
a. Type of screening ( ntry, exit) Y s No  
b. Types f infect ous disease o  diseases that e try and exit cre ning was ta geting Yes  No 
 
c. Type of points of t y (airport , po ts, ground cro sings) wh re measures we e 
impl mented Y s  No 
d. Screening carried out n a ro tine basis or on an ad hoc basis after a public health event has 
occurred and its purpose Yes  No  
e. Description of methods us d in ntry/exit screening (primary/secondary, questionnaire, 
body t mp rature check, technology u ed) Yes No  
f. Type f technology us d (thermometers, scan cameras, o other technology) 
g. After screening, the applied diagnosis protoc l (labor tory a d clinical examination) 
h. Number of cases identified for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
i. Total numbe s of t avelers screened for a specific ti frame Yes  No  
j. Percentag  of persons positive to screening that were diagnosed with th  target d disease 
Yes  No  
k. Percentag  of persons diagnosed with different disease from the ini ially targeted for the 
specific ti fra e (positive and n gative predictiv  values) Yes  No  
l. General screening or target d screening (e.g., t aveler from any affected outbound country, 
all t avelers directly arrivi g only f om affect d countri /areas, ationalit of t avelers, t avelers in-
transit that have called an affecte  coun ry/area  (West Africa)) Yes  No   
m. Reporting on the ass ssment f th public h alth im act of the ntry/exit screeni g 
measures or the cos -eff ctive ess f method  applied
Appendix 3: Quest onnaire for data extraction  
a. Type of screening: entry exit  
b. Types of infect ous disease or diseases that e try and exit screening was targeting  
c. Ty e of points of entry: airports  ports  ground crossings  
d. Screening carried out n a routine basis  or on an ad hoc b sis  after a public health event 
has occurred 
e. Methods used in ntry/exit screening: primary  secondary  questionnaire  body 
temp rature  technology used  else  
f. Type of technology us d: thermometers scan cameras  
Dura on:
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Figure A1. Algorithm for making evidence-based decisions in implementing entry and exit screening 
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Appendix F
Table A2. WHO Temporary recommendations for PHEIC and advice for response measures to other PHE.
Public Health Event WHO Statement/Date
Title Started/Ended
Ebola Virus Disease outbreak in West Africa 8 Aug 2014/29 Mar 2016
Statement on the 1st/8 Aug 2014
Statement on the 2nd meeting/22 September 2014
Statement on the 3rd meeting/23 October 2014
Statement on the 4th meeting/21 January 2015
Statement on the 5th meeting/10 April 2015
Statement on the 6th meeting/7 July 2015
Statement on the 7th meeting/5 October 2015
Statement on the 8th meeting/18 December 2015
Statement on the 9th meeting/29 March 2016
Poliovirus 5 May 2014/15 Aug 2018
Statement on the 3rd meeting/14 November 2014
Statement on the 6th meeting/17 August 2015
Statement on the 7th meeting/26 November 2015
Statement on the 8th meeting/1 March 2016
Statement on the 9th meeting/20 May 2016
Statement on the 10th meeting/22 August 2016
Statement on the 11th meeting/11 November 2016
Statement on the 12th meeting/13 February 2017
Statement on the 13th meeting/2 May 2017
Statement on the 14th meeting/3 August 2017
Statement on the 15th meeting/14 November 2017
Statement on the 16th meeting/14 February 2018
Statement on the 17th meeting/10 May 2018
Statement on the 18th meeting/15 Aug 2018
Statement on the 19th meeting/30 Nov 2018
Ebola outbreak in DRC
10 May 2018/25 July 2018
Statement on the 1st meeting/18 May 2018
External situation report/11,14,18,20,25,29 May 2018
External situation report/1,5,8,12,19,22,26 June 2018
External situation report/1,12,25 July 2018
4 Aug 2018/5 Dec 2018, ongoing
External situation report/7,14,22,28 Aug 2018
External situation report/4,11,18,25 Sept 2018
External situation report/4,9,17,23,30 Oct 2018
External situation report/6,13,21,28 Nov 2018
External situation report/5 Dec 2018
MERS-CoV 9 July 2013/3 Sept 2015 WHO statement on the 10th meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee regarding MERS/ 3 September2015
Yellow fever 31 Aug 2016/16 May 2017 -
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Table A2. Cont.
Public Health Event WHO Statement/Date
Title Started/Ended
Zika virus 8 Mar 2016/18 Nov 2016
Statement on the 1st meeting/18 November 2016
WHO statement on the 2nd meeting/2 September 2016
WHO statement on the 3rd meeting/14 June 2016
WHO statement on the 4th meeting/8 March 2016
WHO statement on the 5th meeting/1 February 2016
Plague 4 Oct 2017/4 Dec 2017
External situation report/4 October 2017
External situation report/9, 12, 17, 20, 26, 31 October 2017
External situation report/6, 9, 14, 17, 20, 27 November 2017
External situation report/4 December 2017
SARS 27 Mar 2003/24 Jun 2003
Update 11—WHO recommends new measures to prevent travel-related spread of SARS/ 27 March 2003
Update 37—WHO extends its SARS-related travel advice to Beijing and Shanxi Province in China and to
Toronto Canada/23 April 2003
Update 42—Travel advice for Toronto, situation in China/29 April 2003
Update 50—WHO extends its SARS-related travel advice to Tianjin, Inner Mongolia and Taipei in
China/8 May 2003
Update 58—First global consultation on SARS epidemiology, travel recommendations for Hebei
Province (China), situation in Singapore/17 May 2003
SARS Travel Recommendations/10 June 2003
Update 80—Change in travel recommendations for parts of China, situation in Toronto/13 June 2003
SARS Travel Recommendations/16 June 2003
Update 82—Change in travel recommendations for Taiwan/17 June 2003
Update 86—Hong Kong removed from list of areas with local transmission/23 June 2003
Update 87—World Health Organisation changes last remaining travel recommendation—for Beijing,
China/24 June 2003
Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 25 Apr 2009/10 Aug 2010
1st meeting/25 April 2009
2nd meeting/27 April 2009
3rd meeting/5 June 2009
4th meeting/11 June 2009
5th meeting/24 September 2009
6th meeting/26 November 2009
7th meeting/24 February 2010
8th meeting/3 June 2010
9th meeting/10 August 2010
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